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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the decade following World War II companies began to drasti­
cally increase their use of computers to solve business problems and to 
process data. At this early stage in the development of the computer 
industry, the companies that manufactured computer hardware also 
produced the software that was used with the machines. These manu­
facturers generally sold the systems software as part of the hardware 
without breaking down the purchase price into its hardware and 
software components. 1 The companies that used the hardware hired 
employees to construct any necessary "custom" software. Few com­
panies constructed systems or applications software for sale apart from 
sales that were "bundled" with hardware. 
As the use of computers became more prevalent in the 1960s, the 
demand for custom programming increased and led to the develop­
ment of a new industry that would supply these software users with 
the programs they needed .. It was still not a common practice, how­
ever, to purchase application programs because they were supplied 
free of charge by the hardware manufacturer. 
In June, 1969, the policy of bundling hardware and software costs 
changed when IBM decided to "unbundle," or state the cost of their 
hardware and software separately.2 This policy resulted in the crea­
1. For a discussion of computer software sales see Gordon & Starr, Software Develop
ment Contracts and Consulting Arrangements: A Structure for Enforceability and Practical­
ity, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 487 (1985). 
2. The decision to "unbundle" was made in part for antitrust reasons. See Schmedel, 
IBM Discloses Its Long Awaited Plan for Separating Its Computer and Services Prices, Wall 
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tion of the computer software industry. Its members began to produce 
software for sale to users of hardware. Companies that formerly wrote 
their own software were given the option of purchasing software. This 
option became very attractive. The costs of developing a program 
might exceed six figures, whereas a comparable program could be 
purchased for under $50,000. This cost relationship led to a rapid in­
crease in the number of firms that manufacture software for sale. A 
program that might cost $1 million to construct could be sold to a 
multitude of customers for $50,000 each. A software firm would, 
therefore, be able to break even after only twenty sales. Any addi­
tional sales would be almost pure profit because the cost of delivering a 
program is basically equal to the cost of the medium used (tape, disk, 
etc.) plus selling expenses. 
A. The Beginning of the Problem: How to Account for Software 
In the same year that IBM decided to unbundle, the Internal 
Revenue Service issued a pronouncement addressing the software is­
sue.3 This Revenue Procedure provided tax accounting guidelines in 
connection with costs incurred to develop, purchase, or lease com­
puter software. This procedure basically stated that the costs associ­
ated with the development of software could be either expensed as 
incurred or capitalized and amortized over five years or less. Thus, 
software development costs were to be accorded the same treatment as 
research and development costs for federal tax purposes.4 
Purchased software, if bundled, could be capitalized along with 
the hardware. Software having a separately stated price could be am­
ortized if treated as an intangible asset. Leased software is accorded 
the same treatment as rentals under regulation 1.162-11.5 
Two years after that pronouncement was issued, the Internal 
Revenue Service issued a second pronouncement dealing with 
software.6 That ruling held that for depreciation and investment tax 
credit purposes, the cost of a new computer includes software costs 
not separately stated and capitalized in accordance with the taxpayer's 
St. J., June 24, 1969, at 38 col. I; Goetz, When IBM Unbundled, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 
31, I 979/Jan. 7, 1980, at 35; Goetz, Unbundling: Will 80's Repeat the 60's?, CoM­
PUTERWORLD, April 14, 1980, at 33; Note, The Revolt Against the Property Tax on 
Software: an Unnecessary Conflict Growing Out of Unbundling, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REv., 
118,124 (1974). 
3. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303. 
4. Id. Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code permits expensing or amortization 
of research and development costs at the taxpayer's option. I.R.C. § 174 (2)(b) (1976). 
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11 (1978). 
6. Rev. Rul. 71-177, 1971-1 C.B. 5. 
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consistent practice. Another pronouncement issued that same year 
held that the capitalization of software costs with respect to a new 
computer, if such costs had previously been expensed, is a change in 
accounting method and requires the Commissioner's consent. 7 
B. What is Software? 
Prior to June, 1969, when IBM unbundled and created the 
software industry, it was unnecessary to define software for accounting 
purposes. Software was accounted for as part of the hardware. The 
few programs that were developed internally constituted such a small 
percentage of the total expenditures for most companies that a formal 
software accounting policy was not necessary. 
As software expenditures continued to increase and become more 
material, however, companies began to establish specific policies for 
software accounting. The definition of software then became impor­
tant. Unfortunately, there is no single readily accepted definition of 
software. The broadest definition would be that software includes 
everything that is not hardware.8 The definition of software promul­
gated by the National Bureau of Standards9 and adopted by the U.S. 
Bureau of Standards is: "Computer programs, procedures, rules, and 
possibly associated documentation concerned with the operation of a 
data processing system."l0 
The Internal Revenue Service defines computer software as: 
[A]ll programs or routines used to cause a computer to perform a 
desired task or set of tasks, and the documentation required to de­
scribe and maintain those programs. Computer programs of all 
classes, for example, operating systems, exceutive [sic] systems 
monitors, compilers and translators, assembly routines, and utility 
programs as well as application programs are included. "Computer 
software" does not include procedures which are external to com­
puter operations, such as instructions to transcription operators and 
external control procedures. I I 
Several courts and state legislatures have also defined software. 
Some have even drawn distinctions between systems software and ap­
plications software. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, for instance, 
7. Rev. Rul. 71-248, 1971-1 C.B. 55. 
8. See Software Industry Analysis, CoMPUTER YEARBOOK 98 (1972). 
9. American National Dictionary for Information Processing, American Standards 
Committee X3 Technical Report 	1-77. 
to. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 11-1, September 30, 1977. 
11. 	 Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303. 
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has defined a systems (operational) program as one that is fundamen­
tal to the functioning of the hardware, or software that controls the 
hardware and makes it run.12 
John W. Bryant and Lance R. Mather state that systems software 
consists of: 
1. compliers, which are used to translate symbolic code into 
machine language and which are also capable of replacing a series of 
instructions with subroutines; 
2. sorts, which assemble and file items of data in a certain se­
quence or order; and 
3. utility routines, which perform functions such as transferring 
data from one magnetic tape to another. 13 
C. The Tangibility Issue 
Another problem created by unbundling is the issue of tangibility. 
The Internal Revenue Service treats software as intangible and there­
fore not eligible for the investment tax credit unless bundled with 
hardware. 14 At least one court has ruled, however, that software is 
tangible and qualifies for the investment tax credit. IS For state sales,16 
use,17 and propertyl8 tax purposes, the majority of courts have held 
that software is intangible and therefore not subject to the tax. Two 
recent cases, however, have held otherwise. 19 For Uniform Commer­
12. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405,406 (Tenn. 1976); see also, 
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Department of Assessments and Tax'n, 271 Md. 674, 
320 A.2d 52 (1974). 
13. Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation a/Computer So/tware. 18 N.Y.L.F. 59,62 
(1972). 
14. Rev. Rul. 71-177, 1971-1 C.B. 5. 
15. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Tex. 1976), 
rev'd. 551 F.2d 599,611 (5th Cir. 1977). 
16. County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App.3d 654,108 Cal. 
Rptr. 434 (1973); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); Bul­
lock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Texas 1977); First Nat'l Bank of Fort 
Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656 (1978). 
17. State v. Central Computer Services, Inc., 349 S.2d 1160 (1977); First Nat'l Bank 
of Springfield v. Department of Revenue. 85 m.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981); Quotron Sys. 
v. Comptroller. 287 Md. 178.411 A.2d 439 (1980); James v. Tres Computer Sys., Inc., 642 
S.W.2d 347 (Mo. banc 1982). 
18. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972); Honeywell Information Sys .• Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171,575 P.2d 
801 (1978); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Department of Assessments and Tax'n, 
271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974). 
19. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 
(1983) (the sale of software constitutes the sale of tangible personal property subject to the 
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cial Code20 and replevin21 purposes, software is tangible, but it is not 
tangible for collapsible corporation purposes.22 The sale of a prewrit­
ten program is currently taxable in thirty-three states23 and exempt in 
thirteen,24 with a few states not yet taking a position orie way or the 
other.25 
D. Financial Accounting Rules 
The present financial accounting rules pertaining to computer 
software are unclear. The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) has issued several pronouncements that deal to a limited ex­
tent with software. One pronouncement26 requires that research and 
. development costs be expensed as incurred, unless there exists an al­
ternative future use for the software. Another pronouncement27 states 
that not all software costs are to be considered research and develop­
ment costs. A third pronouncement28 asserts that software costs not 
qualifying as research and development expenditures are not necessar­
ily inventoriable or deferrable. None of the FASB pronouncements 
Maryland sales tax); Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983) 
(software is tangible and subject to the Vennont use tax). 
20. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F.Supp. 738,742-43 
(D.N.J. 1979), affd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); cf Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Hon­
eywell, Inc., 457 F.Supp. 765,769 (E.D. N.Y. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 
(2d Cir. 1979)(though intangible, software is more readily characterized as "goods" than 
"services" and, therefore, the sale of software is governed by the code); see Carl Beasley 
Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F.Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd 493 F.2d 1400 (3d 
Cir. 1974). 
21. F & M Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F.Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977), affd 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979). 
22. Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 63 T.C. 
327,346-47 (1974). 
23. The sale of a prewritten program is currently taxable in Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massa­
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Caro­
lina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Vennont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. 
24. The sale of a prewritten program is currently exempt from taxation in Alabama, 
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
York, North Dakota, Texas, and the District of Columbia. 
25. Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon have not, at the time 
of this writing, taken a position on whether the sale of a prewritten program is taxable or 
exempt from taxation. 
26. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement ofFinancial Accounting Stan­
dards No.2, "Accounting for Research and Development Costs" (1974). 
27. Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Interpretation No.6, "Applicabil­
ity of FASB Statement No.2 to Computer Software" (1975). 
28. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Technical Bulletin 79-2. "Computer 
Software Costs" (1979). 
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clearly detail when computer software qualifies for capitalization treat­
ment. Furthermore, it is unclear whether software costs should be in­
cluded in the balance sheet as tangible or intangible assets, although 
FASB Interpretation No.6, paragraph 8, footnote 2 seems to indicate 
that software should be classified as intangible. 29 
The Accounting Principles Board, the predecessor of the Finan­
cial Accounting Standards Board, has issued a pronouncement30 re­
quiring that intangibles acquired from others be recorded as assets and 
amortized using the straight-line method (unless some other method is 
more appropriate). That opinion also states that the cost of develop­
ing intangibles that are not specifically identifiable should be expensed 
as incurred. The issue of how to account for identifiable, internally 
developed intangibles is not addressed. It is questionable whether 
computer software should be classified as intangible in any event, since 
the courts seem unable to agree on the tangibility of software. 
II. DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT PRONOUNCEMENTS 
A. FASB Statement No.2 
The FASB research and development statement31 provides as 
much ambiguity as it provides guidance. For instance, paragraph 8(a) 
defines research as "planned search or critical investigation aimed at 
discovery of new knowledge with the hope that such knowledge will be 
useful in developing a new product or service or a new process or tech­
nique or in bringing about a significant improvement to an existing 
product or process."32 
Research is an activity that occurs relatively early in the software 
construction process. Although FASB Statement No.2 requires that 
research expenditures be charged to expense as incurred, there is little 
guidance regarding which activities should be classified as research. 
Paragraph 8(b) defines development as follows: 
[T]he translation of research findings or other knowledge into a plan 
or design for a new product or process or for a significant improve­
29. At least two federal agencies permit the capitalization of software under certain 
circumstances. See United States General Accounting Office, Illustrative Accounting Proce­
dures/or Federal Agencies: Guidelines/or Automatic Data Processing Costs, (Federal Gov­
ernment Accounting Pamphlet No.4, GAO, 1978); see also Interstate Commerce 
Commission, Accounting Series Circulation No. 194, September 17, 1982, which is dis­
cussed in Motor Freight Controller, December, 1982, at 14. 
30. Accounting Principles Board, APB Opinion No. 17, "Intangible Assets," (1970). 
31. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement 0/Financial Accounting Stan­
dards No.2, "Accounting for Research and Development Costs" (1974). 
32. Id. 
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ment to an existing product or process whether intended for sale or 
use. It includes the conceptual formulation, design, and testing of 
product alternatives, construction of prototypes, and operation of 
pilot plants. It does not include routine or periodic alterations to 
existing products, production lines, manufacturing processes, and 
other ongoing operations even though those alterations may repre­
sent improvements and it does not include market research or mar­
ket testing activities.33 
This definition of development can be applied to software accounting 
in two distinct ways. First, it can be interpreted to mean that the de­
velopment phase does not end until software construction is essentially 
complete, because successful completion is uncertain until the devel­
opment process is nearly complete. For the development phase to end 
it is necessary to have a working prototype. The fact that design mod­
ifications are necessary throughout the construction phase is evidence 
that development occurs through that phase. 
Second, it can be interpreted that the development phase has es­
sentially been completed before the construction phase begins. Under 
this interpretation, any design modifications that occur during con­
struction are minor in nature, and are not· part of the development 
phase. The formulation, design, and product testing activities occur 
prior to the construction phase. In fact, there must be a single proquct 
design before construction can commence. Although testing occurs 
during the construction phase, the testing at that stage involves the 
product's operation rather than the testing of alternative products. 
Furthermore, the software construction process does not culminate in 
the production of a prototype or the operation of a pilot plant. These 
guidelines are therefore irrelevant for purposes of determining the end 
of the development phase and the beginning of the production phase. 
The key point for determining the end of the development phase 
should instead be the establishment of technological feasibility. 
Paragraph 31 states: 
Computer software is developed for many and diverse uses. 
Accordingly, in each case the nature of the activity for which the 
software is being developed should be considered in relation to the 
guidelines in paragraphs 8-10 to determine whether software costs 
should be included or excluded. For example, efforts to develop a 
new or higher level of computer software capability intended for 
sale (but not under a contractual arrangement) would be a research 
33. Id. 
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and development activity encompassed by this statement. 34 
The term "new" or higher level of computer software capability 
lends itself to multiple interpretations. If "new" is interpreted in the 
technological sense, most software would be excluded because most 
software is developed using existing rather than new technology. 
"New" may also be interpreted to mean new in the market sense. For 
example, the first company to develop and market a payroll program 
incurs development costs, but companies that subsequently develop a 
similar product do not incur development costs. 
The term "efforts to develop" may also be interpreted in at least 
two ways. It could be interpreted to include the whole construction 
process, which would place all construction expenditures in the devel­
opment phase. It could also be interpreted to mean that "efforts to 
develop" cease prior to the construction phase. These interpretations 
obviously lead to opposite results, as construction expenditures would 
be classified as development costs calling for expense treatment in the 
first instance. Such expenditures would be nonresearch and develop­
ment costs in the second instance, and might call for capitalization 
treatment instead. 
Paragraph 9 of FASB Statement No.2 provides several examples 
of activities that could be considered research and development 
expenditures: 
(a) Laboratory research aimed at discovery of new knowledge. 
(b) 	Searching for applications of new research findings or other 
knowledge. 
(c) Conceptual formulation and design of possible product or pro­
cess alternatives. 
(d) Testing 	 in search for or evaluation of product or process 
alternatives. 
(e) Modification 	of the formulation or design of a product or 
process. 
(f) Design, construction, 	and testing of pre-production prototypes 
and models. 
(g) Design of tools, jigs, molds, and dies involving new technology. 
(h) Design, construction, and operation of a pilot plant that is not 
of a scale economically feasible to the enterprise for commercial 
production. 
(i) Engineering activity required to advance the design of a product 
to the point that it meets specific functional and economic re­
quirements and is ready for manufacture.35 
34. 	 Id. 
35. 	 Id. 
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Activities (a) through (d) generally occur prior to the construc­
tion phase. Example (e), "modification of the formulation or design 
of a product or process," can occur throughout the process, but occurs 
only to a minimal degree once the construction process begins. Design 
modifications can be viewed as part of the development phase or as 
part of the construction phase after development is completed. 
Examples (t) through (h) are viewed by some as not being appli­
cable to software accounting. The end product is not a prototype, but 
rather is the product itself. Others view the prototype as being the end 
product itself in the case of software, which would place the entire 
software construction process within the definition of research and de­
velopment and therefore subject to expense treatment. 
The last example relates to engineering activity. One view holds 
that manufacturing is merely the duplication of the program once the 
program is ready to market, and that all activity occurring prior to 
this point is research and development. Others view all engineering 
activity as occurring prior to construction. 
Paragraph 10 lists examples of activities that typically would be 
excluded from research and development. These activities include: 
(a) 	Engineering follow-through in an early phase of commercial 
production. 
(b) 	Quality control during commercial production including rou­
tine testing of products. 
(c) 	Trouble-shooting in connection with break-downs during com­
mercial production. 
(d) Routine, on-going efforts to refine, enrich, or otherwise improve 
upon the qualities of an existing product. 
(e) 	Adaptation of an existing capability to a particular requirement 
or customer's need as part of a continuing commercial activity. 
(t) 	Seasonal or other periodic design changes to existing products. 
(g) 	Routine design of tools, jigs, molds and dies. 
(h) Activity, including design and construction engineering, related 
to the construction, relocation, rearrangement, or start-up of fa­
cilities or equipment other than (1) pilot plants ... and (2) 
facilities or equipment whose sole use is for a particular re­
search and development project. . . . 
(i) 	Legal work in connection with patent applications or litigation, 
and the sale or licensing of patents. 36 
The first three examples are subject to several interpretations. 
These activities could be viewed as occurring only after sales have 
36. 	 Id. 
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commenced, and that similar activities that occur during construction 
are part of development. Another view is that these activities consti­
tute construction and post construction activities, which indicates that 
construction costs should not be considered part of development. 
B. FASB Interpretation No.6 
Another FASB pronouncement states that "[o]ther costs, includ­
ing those incurred for programming and testing software, are research 
and development costs when incurred in the search for or the evalua­
tion of product or process alternatives or in the design of a pre-produc­
tion model. "37 
The phrase "search for or the evaluation of product or process 
alternatives" is subject to varying interpretations depending on 
whether development is regarded as being virtually complete at the 
beginning of construction or at the end. The term "preproduction 
model" is undefined and its meaning, as it applies to software, remains 
unclear. The preproduction model can be interpreted to be synony­
mous with prototype. Under such an interpretation, all costs incurred 
prior to the completion of the prototype can be viewed as research and 
development costs. Another view is that preproduction models are 
not made for software, although systems makeups or product simula­
tors are sometimes made prior to construction. 
The FASB pronouncement further states "costs for programming 
and testing are not research and development costs when incurred, for 
example, in routine or other on-going efforts to improve an existing 
product or adapt a product . . . to a particular requirement or cus­
tomer's need. "38 
This statement can be interpreted to mean that programming and 
testing costs are not research and development expenditures only 
when they are incurred to improve an existing product or adapt a 
product to a particUlar requirement or customer's need. Alternatively, 
it can be interpreted to exclude programming and testing costs from 
classification as research and development for activities other than 
those given in the example. Furthermore, it can be argued that zero­
ing in on the costs associated with product improvement or adaptation 
misses the point entirely, and that the issue to be addressed should be 
accounting for construction costs. Lastly, one could conclude by a 
literal reading of the interpretation that all enhancement costs should 
37. Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Interpretation No.6, "Applicabil­
ity of FASB Statement No.2 to Computer Software" (1975). 
38. Id. 
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be classified as nonresearch and development. It can be argued, how­
ever, that such a view is unreasonable. The process involved in pro­
ducing enhancements to an existing product is essentially the same as 
that for a new product. Some of the costs involved in the construction 
of a new product are research and development costs. 
C. Technical Bulletin No. 79-2 
Technical Bulletin No. 79-2 states: 
[A]ll costs incurred in producing a given software product or pro­
cess are not necessarily research and development costs. However, 
a determination that software production costs are not research and 
development costs does not necessarily mean that they would be 
inventoriable or deferrable to future operations. Those decisions 
can only be made in light of all the facts and circumstances sur­
rounding the particular situation. 39 
One may conclude from the pronouncement above that little, if 
any, guidance is provided. The issue of research and development cost 
classification is not addressed. Although there is a hint that certain 
costs may be deferrable or inventoriable under certain circumstances, 
the pronouncement fails to elaborate when such circumstances might 
arise. 
III. RELATED PRONOUNCEMENTS 
A. The Record and Music Industry 
It may be argued that the cost of producing a record master is 
similar to the cost of producing a computer program. In both cases: 
1. 	 The majority of the product's value is the result of the labor 
that is expended rather than the material that is used; 
2. 	 logical patterns must be developed (coding or music, either in 
written or nonwritten form) and transferred onto a physical me­
dium such as a record, tape, or disk (although this is not neces­
sarily the case for a computer program, which may be input 
directly into the computer); 
3. 	 the value of the finished product far exceeds the value of the 
material upon which the coding or music is recorded; and 
4. 	 both records and computer programs developed for sale have 
estimated economic lives and projected income streams that are 
difficult but not impossible to predict. 
39. Financial Accounting Standards Board. Technical Bulletin No. 79-2. "Computer 
Software Costs" (1979). 
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, The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy­
righted Works states "[b]oth recorded music and computer programs 
are sets of information in a form which, when passed over a magne­
tized head, cause minute currents to flow in such a way that desired 
physical work is accomplished."4O 
On the other hand, it may be argued that records differ from com­
puter programs that are recorded on disks or tapes.41 For example, 
when information is transferred from a tape into the computer, the 
tape is often not even retained by the user. It may be discarded or 
returned. The information on the tape, unlike a phonograph record, is 
not complete and ready to be used at the time of its purchase. It must 
be translated into a language that is understood by the computer. Fur­
thermore, a computer tape or disk is not necessary to transmit infor­
mation. Such information can be sent over telephone wires or by 
satellite. It may even be programmed directly by the originator of the 
program., 
In 1981, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a 
Statement that permits the capitalization of a record master under cir­
cumstances in which past performance and the artist's current popu­
larity provide a sound basis for estimating that the cost will be 
recovered from future sales: 
The portion of the cost of a record master born by the record 
company shall be reported as an asset if the past performance and 
current popularity of the artist provides a sound basis for estimating 
that the cost shall be charged to expense. The amount recognized 
as an asset shall be amortized over the estimated life of the recorded 
performance using a method that reasonably relates the amount to 
the net revenue expeCted to' be realized.42 ' 
40. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 10 (l978)(hereinafter CONTU REPORT). For a discussion 
of CONTU and the CONTU REPORT see generally Stem, Section 117 ofthe Copyright Act: 
Charter ofthe Software Users' Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 459 
(1985). See also Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 
A.2d 248 (1983); James v. Tres Computer Sys., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347, 351-53 (Mo. banc 
1982)(Rendlen, J., dissenting). 
41. See Heinzman, Computer Software: Should It Be Treated As Tangible Property 
for Ad Valorem Tax?, J. TAX'N 184,184-186 (1972); District of Columbia v. Universal 
Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615,617-20 (D.c. Cir. 1972); James v. Tres Computer 
Sys., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347,348-50 (Mo. 1982); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 
S.W.2d 405,407-08 (Tenn. 1976). 
42. Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Statement No. 50, "Financial Re­
porting in the Record and Music Industry" (1981). See also American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, Statement ofPosition 76-1, "Accounting Practices in the Record and 
Music Industry" (1976). 
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The Financial Accounting Standards board offered the following defi­
nition of record master: 
The master tape resulting from the performance of the artist. 
It is used to produce molds for commercial record production and 
other tapes for use in making cartridges, cassettes, and reel tapes. 
the costs of producing a record master include (a) the cost of the 
musical talent (musicians, vocal background, and arrangements); 
(b) the cost of the technical talent for engineering, directing, and 
mixing; (c) costs for the use of the equipment to record and produce 
the master; and (d) studio facility charges ....43 
In its comment letter to the Exposure Draft that eventually be­
came Statement No. 50, Coopers & Lybrand suggested that the lan­
guage of the Statement be changed to specifically include Publishers of 
Music.44 Similarly, other respondents45 suggested including record 
producers and song writers46 within the language of the Statement. 
B. Motion Picture Films 
Another Statement that might be related to computer software 
costs is FASB Statement No. 53, "Financial reporting by Producers 
and Distributors of Motion Picture Films."47 It allows the capitaliza­
tion of film production costs and requires such costs to be capitalized 
as film cost inventory and to be amortized using the individual-film­
forecast-computation method48 or the periodic-table-computation 
method.49 The individual-film-forecast-computation method amor­
tizes costs in the ratio of current gross revenues to anticipated total 
gross revenues, with adjustment for periodic changes in estimate. 50 
43. FASB Statement No. 50, supra note 42. 
44. Letter from Coopers & Lybrand to Director of Research and Technical Activi­
ties, Financial Accounting Standards Board (Sept. II, 1981). 
45. See Letter from New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants to Di­
rector of Research and Technical Activities, Financial Accounting Standards Board (Aug. 
27, 1981)(File Ref. No. 1063-077); Letter from American Institute of Certified Public Ac­
countants to Mr. Michael O. Alexander, Director of Research and Technical Activities, 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (Oct. IS, 1981)(File Ref. No. 1063-077). 
46. Letter from Arthur Andersen & Co. to Director of Research and Technical Ac­
tivities, Financial Accounting Standan;ls Board, (Sept. 21, 1981); Letter from Arthur 
Young & Co. to Michael O. Alexander, Director of Research and Technical Activities, 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (Sept. 21, 1981). 
47. See Industry Accounting Guide, "Accounting for Motion Picture Films" (1973); 
Statement ofPosition 79-4, "Accounting for Motion Picture Films" (1979). 
48. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement ofFinancial Accounting Stan­
dards No. 53, "Financial Reporting in the Record and Music Industry" (1981). 
49. Id. at paragraphs 10 and 13. 
50. Id. at paragraph 12. 
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The periodic-table-computation method amortizes film costs using the 
historic revenue patterns of a large group of films.51 
The analogy of motion picture films to software has been sug­
gested in several court cases. Furthermore, several court cases dealing 
with sales, use, property, or federal taxation of motion picture films or 
master negatives52 have been cited by courts hearing software tax 
issues. 53 
C. Research and Development Arrangements 
Another F ASB Statement54 addresses the topic of research and 
development arrangements. During the course of several interviews 
conducted as part of this research project, it was suggested that some 
software vending companies enter into research and development ar­
rangements in order to treat costs that would otherwise be expensed as 
assets. These arrangements may be structured so that a separate entity 
undertakes the task of constructing software that would otherwise be 
constructed internally. The separate entity then sells the finished 
51. In its comment letter to the Exposure Draft of Statement No. 50 (dated Aug. 27, 
1981) (File Ref. No. 1063-074), the New York State Society of Certified Public Account­
ants recommended that reference to the periodic-table-computation be deleted because the 
film industry generally follows the individual film forecast method on a film-by-film basis. 
The letter also points out that other methods can always be used as long as the result would 
not be materially different, and any reference to other methods would only add confusion. 
Arthur Young & Co. made a similar comment (letter dated Sept. 21, 1981), as did the 
Accounting Standards Division of the AICPA (letter dated Nov. 13, 1981). Several re­
spondents to the Exposure Draft also mentioned that reference should be made to interest 
capitalization costs. 
Even though the periodic-table-computation method might not be the most widely 
used method in the film industry, it might find acceptance in the software industry because 
a larger variety of products are produced in the latter industry. 
52. See Bing Crosby Productions, Inc. v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 
1979); Walt Disney Productions v. United States (Disney I), 327 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 
1971), modified, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 93 (1974); Walt Disney 
Productions V. United States (Disney III), 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1977); Boswell V. Para­
mount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973); see also Florida Associa­
tion of Broadcasters V. Kirk, 264 So.2d 437, cert. denied, 268 So.2d 534 (1972); Crescent 
Amusement Co. V. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948); In re Merrill Theatre 
Corp. Sales and Use Tax, 138 Vt. 397,415 A.2d 1327 (1980); Mount Mansfield Television, 
Inc. V. Vermont Comm'r of Taxes, 133 Vt. 284, 336 A.2d 193 (1975); Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc. V. Commissioner, 176 Conn. 604, 410 A.2d 457 (1979); United Artists 
Corp. V. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 334, N.E.2d 254 (1937); Turner Communications Corp. V. 
Chilivis, 239 Ga. 91, 236 S.E.2d 251 (1977); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 
405 (Tenn. 1976); Michael Todd Co. V. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 21 Cal. 
Rptr. 604, 371 P.2d 340 (1962). 
53. See. e.g., Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976). 
54. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement ofFinancial Accounting Stan­
dards No. 68, "Research and Development Arrangements" (1982). 
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software product to the arranging firm, which promptly records the 
software as an asset. Had the software been constructed internally, 
there would be pressure to expense the construction cost as research 
and development. A survey was mailed to software vendors in con­
junction with the research for this article. The survey supported the 
above theory, although the responses revealed that a very small per­
centage of software vendors participate in research and development 
arrangements. Those that do have valid business reasons for partici­
pating, apart from the beneficial financial statement effect. ss 
IV. 	 SOFTWARE COSTS: SHOULD THEY BE CAPITALIZED OR 
EXPENSED? 
Prior to June, 1969, when IBM unbundled, this question was not 
an issue. Software costs were included in the price of the hardware. 
The costs were amortized over the useful life of the hardware. After 
IBM began stating its software prices separately from its hardware 
prices, and as firms began to develop their own software, this question 
frequently began to be raised. Over the past two decades, software 
costs have become an increasingly important expenditure in most cor­
porate budgets. While it was easy to expense relatively minor software 
costs in the past, for reasons of materiality it has become increasingly 
difficult to state emphatically that software expenditures are immate­
rial when they continue to increase every year. 56 
FASB defines assets as "probable future economic benefits ob­
tained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transac­
tions or events."S7 
The Statement states further: 
An asset has three essential characteristics: (a) it embodies a 
probable future benefit that involves a capacity, singly or in combi­
nation with other assets, to contribute directly or indirectly to fu­
ture net cash inflows, (b) a particular enterprise can obtain the 
benefit and control others' access to it, and (c) the transaction or 
other event giving rise to the enterprise's right to or control of the 
55. R. MCGEE, ACCOUNTING FOR SOFTWARE CoSTS (1984). Chapter five of Ac­
COUNTING FOR SoFTWARE CoSTS discusses vendor participation and research develop­
ment costs. 
56. A spokesman for lIT has revealed that $27.9 million in software development 
costs were placed on the balance sheet as assets in 1982, compared to earnings of $702.8 
million. See Hudson, SEC May Curb Accounting Rule for Software, Wall St. J., April 8, 
1983 at p. 52, col I. For a further discussion of software accounting see generally McGee, 
Software Accounting Policy: Does it Matter? 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 705 (1985). 
57. Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Statement No.3 (1974). 
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benefit has already occurred. 58 
Expenses, on the other hand, have doubtful future economic ben­
efit. From these criteria, the answer appears simple. Software that has 
probable future economic benefit should be recorded as an asset and 
amortized over its estimated economic life. Software with doubtful 
economic benefit should be expensed. Unfortunately, the answer is 
not quite that simple. Some accountants argue for capitalization59 
while others continue to argue for expense treatment. 60 Several arti­
cles have addressed the topic in recent years,61 and it appears that the 
issue will continue to be in the news for the next few years. The 
AICPA has formed a task force to study the issue,62 and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission has imposed a moratorium on the capitali­
zation of certain software costS.63 
A. The Controversy 
The controversy, simply stated, is whether software costs should 
be classified as assets or expensed. The question, however, is not 
merely philosophical. The choice can affect a company's earnings as 
well as its ability to raise capital. There are at least 4,000 companies in 
the United States that construct software for sale. Software expendi­
tures for all such companies constitute a significant percentage of net 
58. Id. 
59. See Paulsen, Software Development Costs Should Be Capitalized, MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNTING 40,40-42 (1983); see also McGee, supra note 56 at 706. 
60. See Gannon & Parkinson, Software Development Costs Should Be Expensed, 
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 37,39 (1983). 
61. A sample of articles that address software accounting policy include Adams, Pr0­
gramming Computer Software Into Financial Statements, Going Concerns, Queens College 
Accounting Honor Society, October 19, 1983, at 4; Alex Brown & Sons, Industry Account­
ing Concerns, COMPUTER SERVICES MONTHLY (Aug., 1982); Burns & Peterson, Account­
ingfor Computer Software, J. ACCT. 50,51,53-56,58 (April, 1982); Expenses, Shmexpenses, 
FORBES 13 (May 23, 1983); Fingleton, Capital Offense, FORBES 100,100-101 (Jan. 17, 
1983); Fingleton, u.s. Laws Hit Hi-Tech, ACCOUNTANCY AGE 21 (April 21, 1983); Littrel, 
Death ofan Asset-The R&D Blood Bath, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 63 (Jan., 1981); 
McGee, Accounting for Software-A Progress Report, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 38,66 
(Jan., 1983); McGee, Accounting for Software Costs Study Is Under Way, AssOCIATION 
LEADER 1,9 (Oct., 1983); McGee, Software Accounting is New MAP Project, AssOCIATION 
LEADER 1,1-2 (Jan., 1983); Neal, Caution for Lotus-Eaters, FORBES, 52,54 (Sept. 26, 1983); 
Pridemore, Software: Should Development Costs be Expensed or Capitalized?, MANAGE­
MENT ACCOUNTING, 33,33-36 (Nov., 1983). 
62. Task Force of AcSec Studies Computer Software Accounting, J. ACCT. 9 (June, 
1983). 
63. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Accounting for Costs of Internally De­
veloping Computer Software for Sale or Lease to Others, 17 C.F.R. Parts 210 and 239; 
Release Nos. 33-6476; 34-20061; FR-12, File No. S7-968. Aug. 8, 1983. Published in the 
Federal Register Vol. 48, No. 157, Friday, Aug. 12, 1983, at 36566-36571. 
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income. Classifying software expenditures as assets or expenses can 
make the difference between making a profit or incurring a loss. One 
public company that reported a profit of $2.2 million in 1981 would 
have had a loss of $1 million that year if certain software expenditures 
had been expensed instead of capitalized. In 1982, the reported $2.5 
million profit would have been a $4 million 10ss.64 There is some evi­
dence to suggest that accounting policy can affect expansion65 and the 
ability to raise capital. 66 The interviews conducted in the course of 
this study and the questionnaire responses confirm this conclusion. 
B. The Catalyst 
If there is a single event responsible for the birth of the software 
accounting issue, it is the issuance by the Association of Data Process­
ing Service Organizations (ADAPSO) of the Exposure Draft on 
software accounting67 in April, 1982. This Exposure Draft detailed 
clear guidelines for accounting for software costs and revenues. Its 
issuance caused the AICP A to form a task force to study the issue. 
V. AUTHOR'S VIEWS 
Most software that is purchased or constructed internally does 
not fit within the definition of research and development. Most 
software is constructed from existing technology using existing coding 
methods. Any research and development occurs in the early stages 
prior to construction. Software is beyond the development stage when 
technological feasibility is established. 
The interviews conducted in conjunction with this study and the 
questionnaire survey results indicate that many companies automati­
cally assume that internally constructed software falls within the defi­
nition of research and development. Internally constructed software is 
64. Fingleton, Capital Offense, FORBES 100,100-101 (Jan. 17, 1983); see also Fingle­
ton, u.s. Laws Hit Hi-Tech, ACCOUNTANCY AGE 21 (April 21, 1983); Expenses, 
Shmexpenses, FORBES 10,13 (May 23, 1983). 
65. See Horwitz & Kolodny, Has the FASB Hurt Small High-Technology Compa­
nies?, HARV. Bus. REv. 44,48-52, (1980); see also McGee supra note 56 at 706. 
66. See R. MCGEE, THE EFFECTS OF SOFIWARE ACCOUNTING POLICIES ON BANK 
LENDING DECISIONS AND STOCK PRICE (1984); El-Arabi, "The Effects of Accounting Al­
ternatives on Lending Decisions of Commercial Bankers," Ph.D. dissertation, The Louisi­
ana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1977; EI-Maksy, "A 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of FASB Statement No. 33 on Lend­
ing Decisions," Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, 1983; Jain, "A Study of 
the Effects of Alternative Methods of Accounting for Income Taxes on Term Loan Deci­
sions," Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1970. 
67. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, "Accounting Guidelines 
for the Computer Services Industry," Exposure Draft, April, 1982. 
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therefore often expensed. It is the opinion of this author that such a 
view is incorrect. Each software project should be evaluated on its 
own merits and classified accordingly. 
The accounting treatment for purchased software should mirror 
the accounting treatment for comparable internally constructed 
software. If a company plans to use a payroll program or accounts 
receivable program for the next five years, the cost of obtaining that 
program should be amortized over five years, regardless of whether 
the software was purchased or internally constructed. 
The responses from the interviews and the questionnaire indicate 
that the present practice of most companies includes expensing inter­
nally constructed software and capitalizing purchased software. The 
usual reasons for this practice are that it is easier to determine the cost 
of purchased software, or that a purchased software product has a bet­
ter chance of having future economic benefit because it has already 
been extensively tested and debugged. In this author's opinion, these 
reasons are insufficient. Merely because the cost of a purchased pro­
gram is easier to determine is not sufficient reason to expense the costs 
of internally constructing comparable software. Once the feasibility of 
a project has been determined, the risk of failure is small enough to 
warrant capitalization treatment. Furthermore, the production costs 
of motion picture films and records are already being capitalized. The 
production process for software is similar in many ways to that of 
records and films. 
The cost of internally constructed software can be broken down 
into the following six categories: 
1. 	 Feasibility costs, and other costs incurred prior to design costs 
in the software product life cycle; 
2. 	 design costs; 
3. 	 coding costs; 
4. 	 testing costs; 
5. 	 support costs; and 
6. 	 service costs. 
In cases where the finished software product is expected to have 
future economic benefit, the costs that are incurred for designing, cod­
ing, and testing should be capitalized and amortized over the expected 
period of benefit. Pre-design costs, such as feasibility costs, should be 
expensed. Furthermore, service and support costs should be expensed 
because these costs have doubtful future economic benefit, and more 
nearly resemble period costs than capitalizable costs. 
The straight-line method is an acceptable method of amortization 
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for intangible assets. This method can be used in cases where software 
is classified as intangible. 
At least two other methods may also be considered for software 
that is developed for sale. The period-table-computation method, 
which is sometimes used to amortize motion picture film costs, can be 
used to amortize software intended for sale. This method amortizes 
software costs prepared from historic revenue patterns of a large group 
of previously marketed software products. Although that revenue pat­
tern is assumed to provide a reasonable guide to the experience of suc­
ceeding groups of software products produced and distributed under 
similar conditions, these tables should not be used for a software prod­
. uct that is expected to have a significantly different revenue pattern 
from those products which were included in the table. The periodic 
tables should be reviewed regularly and updated whenever revenue 
patterns change significantly. 
An acceptable alternative method of amortization is the individ­
ual-software-forecast-computation method, a variation of which is 
used to amortize motion picture film production costs. This method 
may be illustrated by the following examples: 
Assume that a certain software product costs $18,000,000 to de­
velop and is expected to generate revenues of $50,000,000 over its use­
ful economic life. By the end of the second year, the amount of total 
anticipated revenues is reduced to $30,000,000 due to lagging sales. 
Actual revenue received in each of the first three years is: 
First year $10,000,000 
Second year $ 6,000,000 
Third year $ 5,000,000 
Amortization in each of the first three years is computed as follows: 
First year $10,000,000 
Second year $ 6,000,000 
Third year $ 5,000,000 
Amortization in each of the first three years is computed as follows: 
Amount of 
First Year Amortization 
$10,000,000 X $18,000,000 
$3,600,000 
$50,000,000 
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Second Year 
Assuming change in anticipated total revenues 
(a) 	 from $50,000,000 to $30,000,000: 
$ 6,000,000 X $14,440,000 
$4,320,000 
$20,000,000 
Where: 
(1) 	 $6,000,000 is actual revenue in the second year; 
(2) 	 $20,000,000 is the adjusted total anticipated remaining 
revenue ($30,000,000 - $10,000,000); 
and 
(3) 	 $14,400,000 is original cost ($18,000,000) 

less accumulated amortization ($3,600,00) 

Assuming no change in anticipated total 
(b) 	 revenues: 
$ 6,000,000 X $18,000,000 
$2,160,000 
$50,000,000 
Third Year 
Assuming change in anticipated total revenues 
(a) 	 from $50,000,000 
$ 6,000,000 X $14,440,000 
$4,320,000 
$20,000,000 
Where: 
(1) 	 $6,000,000 is actual revenue in the second year; 
(2) 	 $20,000,000 is the adjusted total anticipated remaining 
revenue ($30,000,000 - $10,000,000); 
and 
(3) 	 $14,400,000 is original cost ($18,000,000) 

less accumulated amortization ($3,600,00) 

Assuming no change in anticipated total 
(b) 	 revenues: 
$ 6,000,000 X $18,000,000 
$2,160,000 
$50,000,000 
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Third Year 
Assuming change in anticipated total revenues 
(a) from $50,000,000 to $30,000,000: 
$ 5,000,000 X $14,440,000 
$3,600,000 
$20,000,000 
The adjusted total anticipated remaining 

revenue ($20,000,000) and adjusted cost 

($14,400,000) need not be reduced by the 

second year actual revenue ($6,000,000), and 

second year amortization ($4,320,000) 

respectively, because adjusted total anticipated 

remaining revenue ($20,000,000) did not 

change from the second to third year. If the 

reduction were made, the result would not 

change. 

$ 5,000,000 X ($14,440,000-$4,320,000) 
$3,600,000 
$20,000,000 
- $6,000,000 
Assuming no change in anticipated total 
(b) revenues: 
$ 5,000,000 X $18,000,000 
$1,800,000 
$50,000,000 
Although the individual-software-forecast-computation method 
and the period-table-computation method may be appropriate 
amortization methods in certain instances, they are not necessarily the 
only acceptable methods. Other methods that reasonably relate the 
amount of the revenue expected to be realized to the amount of 
capitalized expenditures are also acceptable. 
Software costs meeting the definition of research and 
development should be expensed as incurred in keeping with FASB 
Statement No.2. If the software has alternative future uses, however, 
it should be capitalized and amortized over the period of expected 
benefit. The alternative future use test does not apply to the internal 
development of computer software.68 
Software expenditures, if considered tangible property, should be 
classified as assets included in the "fixed assets" portion of the balance 
68. See FASB Interpretation No.6, paragraph 8, n.2. 
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sheet. Intangible software expenditures qualifying as assets should 
appear in the "other assets" section of the balance sheet. 
Software expenditures should not be separately disclosed unless 
they are material in amount. Software expenses can be considered 
material if they equal or exceed five percent of sales. Software assets 
can be considered material if they equal or exceed five percent of total 
assets. Disclosure may be by footnote or by separately stating 
software expenditures in the body of the income statement or balance 
sheet. 
When the possibility exists to acquire hardware and software 
"bundled" or "unbundled," the following factors should be 
considered: 
A. Amortization 
Software that might otherwise be expensed might be depreciated 
if combined with hardware costs. Likewise, software that would be 
capitalized if bundled might qualify for expense treatment if stated 
separately. 
B. Investment Tax Credit 
Software that would not otherwise qualify for the investment tax 
credit may so qualify if it is bundled with the related hardware. Even 
if software is acquired separately, the possibility of taking an invest­
ment tax credit should be examined. At least one court has held that 
the investment tax credit may be taken on unbundled software. 
c. Sales/Use Tax 
Bundling hardware and software may increase the amount of 
sales/use tax a buyer is required to pay. Some states do not tax the 
sale of software if sold separately from the hardware. Software deliv­
ered on cards, disk, or magnetic tape might be subject to tax in some 
states, even though the identical software, if delivered over telephone 
lines, would not be taxed. 
D. Property Tax 
Bundling hardware and software may increase the amount of 
property tax the owner must pay. Many states levy a property tax on 
tangible property only. Software, if accounted separately from hard­
ware, is often classified as intangible property. 
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E. 	 Different Accounting Treatments 
The accounting treatment for financial reporting need not be the 
same as that used for tax reporting. Software expenditures may be 
expensed as incurred for tax purposes and capitalized and amortized 
for financial reporting purposes and vice versa. If different methods 
are used, the tax effect of the difference is reflected in the deferred tax 
account. 
ACCOUNTING FOR SOFTWARE 
Alternative 
Future Use Capitalize 
'\!..O='-"-''''-_ R&D Expense 
Created R&D Expense 
Probable Future 
Economic Benefit Capitalize 
No Probable Future 
Economic Benefit G&A. Selling or Production Expense 
Feasibility 
Conceptual Design 
or Maintenance 
G&A, Selling or Production Expense 
Probable Future 
P==-""'=-Capitalize 
No Probable 
Future Economic 
Benefit
""'='-----G&A, Selling or Production 
Expense 
VI. STATE TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
A. 	 Tangibility 
Whether software is classified as tangible or intangible often de­
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termines whether the software in question is subject to the state sales, 
use, or property tax. Software, if intangible, is generally exempt from 
tax. Many states place a tax on the sale, use, or ownership of tangible 
computer software. Some states treat "canned" programs as tangible 
property subject to tax, whereas "custom" programs are classified as 
intangible or as a service rather than a product.69 As of late 1983, 
thirty-three states assessed a sales or use tax on prewritten programs 
and twenty states did so for custom programs.70 
Prior to 1972, no court had ruled on the tangibility or taxability 
of software, because software had always been sold in conjunction 
with hardware without any separate price being stated. Shortly after 
IBM "unbundled" in 1969, the price of software began to be stated 
separately from the hardware. Although computer hardware was 
clearly tangible and therefore subject to the sales, use, and property 
tax, the classification of software was less clear. The first case to ad­
dress the tangibility of software was District of Columbia v . .Universal 
Computer AsSOCS. 71 In Universal, the Court held that the "canned" 
and "custom" programs in question were intangible and therefore not 
subject to the personal property tax,72 the rationale being that it was 
the intangible information contained on the cards that was being 
purchased, rather than the cards themselves. Once the information 
contained in the cards was transferred into the computer, all that re­
mained was the knowledge, which is intangible.73 
Other courts have applied different tests to determine tangibility 
of software. The Texas Supreme Court, for instance, applied the "es­
sence of the transaction" test, and held where the transaction is in 
essence the purchase of an intangible, such as a custom or canned pro­
69. Prewritten programs, also called "canned" or "off the shelf' programs, are stan­
dardized programs that are sold to many buyers "as is," without alteration. "Custom" 
programs are written to meet the needs of one particular customer and are often treated as 
the sale of a service rather than the sale of a product. 
70. See PALENSKI, SALES AND USE TAX STATUS OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS BY 
STATE (1983). 
71. 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
72. Id. at 619. 
73. This line of reasoning is called the "knowledge rationale." Other cases have re­
lied on a similar line of reasoning to justify the classification of software as intangible. In a 
Tennessee case it was held that both systems and applications software are intangible in 
cases where the tangible medium used (card, tape, disk, etc.) is either returned to the seller 
or destroyed. The reasoning is that the property purchased is actually intangible knowl­
edge, and the use of a tangible medium to transfer that intangible knowledge is "merely 
incidental to the purchase of the intangible knowledge and information stored on the 
tapes." Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 at 408 (Tenn. 1976). This line 
of reasoning is called the "personal service rationale." Id. 
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gram, the sale is exempt from the Texas sales tax which applies only to 
the sale of tangible property.74 
The "relative value" test has also been applied to software tax 
cases;75 This test recognizes software creation to be a process involv­
ing both tangible and intangible elements. Most of the value of a 
software product is attributable to the intellectual content. The tangi­
ble medium used to store and transfer this knowledge represents mere 
incidental costs. Programs selling for $100,000 might be stored on a 
tape or disk costing less than $50. The purchaser of a program, there­
fore, actually purchases "knowledge," rather than a physical product. 
The "mode of transmission" test has also been applied in several 
cases.76 This test holds that the sale in question is the sale of intangi­
ble property where the knowledge can be conveyed from the seller to 
the buyer without the use of a physical medium such as a card, tape, 
or disk. Computer programs can be transferred directly to the buyer's 
computer over telephone lines or by satellite. 
B. Case Law in Related Areas 
Prior to 1972, there were no precedents for courts to consider 
with respect to software taxation. Analogies were drawn, therefore, 
between software and other types of property. Several courts have 
analogized software programs to films and phonograph records. 77 
74. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1979). 
75. See James v. TRES Computer Sys., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. banc 1982). 
James cites District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) and Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976) as two cases 
that employed this rationale. James, 642 S.W.2d at 349. 
76. See District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l 
Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); State of Ala. v. Central 
Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160 (Ala. 1977). These cases are discussed in some 
detail in James, 642 S.W.2d at 348-50. 
77. See Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983); Commerce 
Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); Comptroller of the Treasury v. 
Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983); First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. 
Department of Revenue, 85 Ill.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981); Greyhound Computer Corp. 
v. State Dep't of Assessments and Tax'n, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974); James v. TRES 
Computer Serv., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. banc 1982). 
For cases involving the tangibility of films and records for sales, use, and property tax 
purposes, see Recording Devices Co. v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 518, 190 N.E.2d 258 (1963); 
Recording Devices Co. v. Porterfield, 30 Ohio St.2d 208, 283 N.E.2d 626 (1972); Michael 
Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles 57 Cal.2d 684, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 371 P.2d 340 (1962); 
University Microfilms v. Scio Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265 (1977), leave 
to appeal denied, 402 Mich. 880 (1978); Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 
Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973); Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112,213 
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Computer software has much in common with films and records, but 
several distinctions can be made as well. Most of the value of a film or 
record is attributable to the intellectual and artistic content rather 
than the celluloid, plastic, or paper upon which that content is re­
corded. 7s The plastic or celluloid upon which the record or film is 
recorded is a crucial element. 79 Without the plastic there could be no 
record, without the film there could be no movie. Cards, tape, and 
disks, however, are not necessary to store a computer program and 
can be transferred to another physical location by telephone line or 
satellite. 
Another distinction that can be made between film and software 
is that the medium upon which the computer program is recorded can 
be returned to the seller or destroyed after the program has been run 
through the computer. Movie film, on the other hand, has continuing 
value after the movie has been shown, it can be used again and again. so 
A similar analogy can be made to phonograph records.sl 
A third distinction drawn between software and films and records 
is that the latter items can be used immediately upon purchase, 
whereas software must first be translated into a language that can be 
understood by the computer.S2 Furthermore, films and records are 
immediately perceptible to the senses, whereas software, in essence, is 
not.S3 
A fourth distinction that has been made between software and 
films and records is that the software sales or licensing agreement 
often includes periodic updating by the seller. Films and records, on 
the other hand, are not updated after the sale. S4 This distinction, how-
S.W.2d 27 (1948); United Artists Corp. v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 334, 7 N.E.2d 254 (1937); 
Saenger Realty Corp. v. Grosjean, 194 La. 470, 193 So. 710, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 613 
(1940); J.A. Burgess Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 427, 194 N.E. 565 (1935); District of Columbia 
v. Norwood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc. v. 
State Bel. of Equalization, 101 Cal. App.3d 184, 161 Cal. Rptr. 558, 615 P.2d 555 (1980). 
78. Films, records, and books are generally treated as tangible property for sales tax 
purposes. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
79. See Heinzman, Computer Software: Should It Be Treated As Tangible Property 
For Ad Valorem Tax?, 37 J. TAX'N 184,185 (1972); Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation of 
Computer Software 18 N.Y.L.F. 58,74 (1972). 
80. See District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615,617­
18 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W. 2d 405,408 (Tenn. 1976). 
81. 538 S.W.2d at 408. 
82. See Alabama v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160,1162 (Ala. 1977); 
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405,408 (Tenn. 1976). 
83. See Case, Sales and Use Tax of Computer Software-Is Software Tangible per­
sonal Property?, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 1503,1518 (1981). 
84. Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation of Computer Software, 18 N.Y.L.F. 59,74 
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ever, does not apply to the many programs that are not updated after 
sale. 
Courts have also considered the issue of whether the sale of com­
puter software constitutes the sale of a product or a personal service. 
This issue is frequently raised in service bureau cases,85 although anal­
ogies to the Uniform Commercial Code86 and the sale of information87 
have also been proffered. Generally, if software is viewed as a product 
or good, it is tangible property subject to sales, use, and property taxa­
tion. If viewed as a service, however, software is intangible and not 
subject to these taxes. Canned programs are more likely to be viewed 
as products than are custom programs, which involve more personal 
service. 
Software often involves elements of both sales and services, and 
courts have developed several tests to aid the development of this dis­
tinction. One test is whether the transfer of property is necessary or 
merely convenient in order to achieve the primary purpose of the 
(1972), reprinted in abbreviated/orm in THE MONTHLY DIGEST OF TAX ARTICLES, 31-40 
(March, 1983). 
85. See Intellidata, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 139 Cal. App.3d 594, 188 Cal. 
Rptr. 850 (1983); Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, Florida Div. of Admin. Hear­
ings, No.76-1475 (1976); Credit Bureau of Miami County, Inc. v. Collins, 50 Ohio St.2d 
270,364 N.E.2d 27 (1977); Miami Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Lindley, 50 Ohio St.2d 249,364 
N.E.2d 25 (1977); Citizens Financial Corp. v. Kosydar, 43 Ohio St.2d 148,331 N.E.2d 435 
(1975); Accountants Computer Servs., Inc. v. Kosydar; Central Data sys., Inc. v. Kosydar; 
Jergens Co. v. Kosydar, all reported at 35 Ohio St.2d 120, 298 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio 1973); 
Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 
656 (1978). 
86. The Uniform Commercial Code distinguishes the sale of "goods" from the sale of 
"services." For UCC cases that have been cited in cases addressing the issue of software 
taxation, see Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, (E.D.N.Y . 
. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); F & M Schaefer Corp. v. Elec­
tronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd mem., 614 F.2d 1286 (2d 
Cir. 1979); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), 
affd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973); Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. 
App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972) . 
. 87. For cases involving the sale of mailing lists, see Fingerhut Prod Co. v. Commis­
sioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977); Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division 
of Tax'n, 182 N.J. Super. 179,440 A.2d 104 (1981); Mertz v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 
A.D.2d 396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1982). For cases involving the sale of stock exchange 
information, see Quotron Sys. v. Comptroller, 287 Md. 178,411 A.2d 439 (1980); Dun & 
Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (1937); Bunker-Ramo Corp. 
v. Porterfield, 21 Ohio St.2d 231, 257 N.E.2d 365 (1970). For other cases addressing the 
product versus service, see Washington Times-Herald v. District of Columbia, 213 F.2d 23 
(D.C. Cir. 1954)(artwork); Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Department of 
Revenue, 366 S.2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(artwork); Credit Bureau of Miami 
County, Inc. v. Collins, 50 OhioSt.2d 270,364 N.E.2d 27 (1977)(credit information); Gen­
eral Data Corp. v. Porterfield, 21 Ohio St.2d 233, 257 N.E.2d 359 (1970)(hotel reservation 
information). 
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transaction.88 Another test is whether the value of the materials is 
small compared to the value of the services.89 A third test is whether 
the item transferred has value only to the purchaser (as is the case 
when a custom program is acquired), or whether the item can be sold 
to the general public (as is the case with canned programs).90 
In the case of canned programs, no services are performed. 
Canned programs are sold "off the shelf," and are available to the pub­
lic-at-Iarge. They are conveyed to the purchaser on a tangible prop­
erty such as a card, tape, or disk. The tangible medium is merely 
incidental to the transaction. In contrast, custom programs are 
designed for a particular customer and are of no value to the general 
public. The value of the tangible medium is slight, compared to the 
val':le of the services required to write the custom program. 
C. Software Tax Cases 
The first case to directly address the software tangibility issue was 
District of Columbia v. Universal Computer AsSOCS.,91 which held that 
software was intangible and therefore not subject to the personal prop­
erty tax. The following year, the California court held that software is 
intangible and therefore not subject to the sales tax.92 In another early 
case,93 Greyhound Computer Corporation purchased several com­
puter systems in which the price of the hardware and software were 
not separately stated. The Maryland Department of Assessments and 
Taxation treated the cost of the software as inseparable from that of 
the hardware and based its property tax assessment on aggregate 
purchase price, less depreciation, without allocating the cost of the 
software package between tangible property acquired and services to 
88. Bigsby v. Johnson, 99 P.2d 268 (1940), rev'd. on other grounds, 18 Ca1.2d 860, 
118 P.2d 289 (1941); Howitt v. Street & Smith Publications, Inc., 276 N.Y. 345, 12 N.E.2d 
435 (1938). See also Case, Sales and Use Tax ofComputer Software - Is Software Tangible 
Personal Property?, 27 WAYNE LAW REv. 1520 (1981). 
89. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972); Mahon v. Nudelman, 377 111.331,36 N.E.2d 550(1941); Community Telecast­
ing Servo v. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500 (Me. 1966); Barry-Kofron Dental Lab. Co. v. Smith, 
345 Mo. 922, 137 S.W.2d 452 (1940); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 
(Tenn. 1976). 
90. United Aircraft Corp. v. O'Connor, 141 Conn. 530, 107 A.2d 398 (1954); Bucy­
rus-Erie Co. v. Lorenz, 26 Ill.2d 183, 186 N.E.2d 250 (1962); University Microfilms v. Scio 
Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265 (1977),leave to appeal denied, 402 Mich. 
880 (1978). 
91. 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
92. County of Sacramento v. Assessment App. Bd., 32 Cal. App.3d 654,671, 108 
Cal. Rptr. 434,446 (1973). 
93. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments and Tax'n, 271 Md. 
674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974). 
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be rendered. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it was error 
not to allocate the purchase price between the tangible and intangible 
components. The court remanded the case for further proceedings.94 
In Commerce Union Bankv. Tidwell,9s the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee held that the sale of software is the sale of information, and 
that the magnetic tapes that contain this information are only a 
method of transmitting these intellectual creations from the source to 
the user. The court concluded further that it is merely incidental that 
these intangibles are transmitted by way of a tangible reel of tape that 
is not even retained by the user. Tennessee did not attempt to tax 
computer programs purchased by the bank which were transmitted to 
its computers from outside the state by way of telephone lines. That 
method was deemed to constitute the purchase of intangible personal 
property.96 The court stated "the principle is the same, only the 
method of transmitting the information is difi"erent."97 
The year after Tidwell was decided in Tennessee, the Alabama 
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a similar case. In State 
ofAla. v. Central Computer Servs., Inc.,98 Central Computer Services 
licensed certain software programs for a ninety-nine year term. Upon 
receipt of the software, Central extracted the information contained on 
the magnetic tapes and punched cards, and transferred the programs 
to magnetic discs. The tapes were then returned to the lessor and the 
cards were discarded. The Alabama State Department of Revenue as­
sessed a use tax of $13,519.91 against Central for its purchase of the 
programs. Central alleged the programs were intangible property and, 
therefore, not subject to the use tax. Holding for Central, the court 
ruled that Central purchased the information or knowledge which 
went into the development of the eight programs. It did, however, 
also purchase tapes and punched cards. The magnetic tapes and 
punched cards were merely the means by which this information or 
94. Id. at 682, 320 A.2d at 57. For analogies to the film-making industry, the court 
cited Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. 604, 371 P.2d 340 (1962) 
and District of Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746 (1964). This analogy was 
challenged in Heinzman, Computer Software: Should It Be Treated As Tangible Property 
For Ad Valorem Tax?, 37 J. TAX'N 184,185-87 (1972). 
95. 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976). The result in Tidwell has since been changed by 
statute. See TENN. CoDE ANN. § 67-6-203 (1983). 
96. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d at 408. 
97. Id. 
98. 349 So.2d 1160 (1977). This case was a case of first impression in Alabama. The 
court's decision was influenced by Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 
(Tenn. 1976) and District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 
(1972). 
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knowledge was transferred.99 The state cited Boswell v. Paramount 
Television Sales, Inc. loo In Boswell, the court held that the leasing of 
movie films and tapes by Paramount to television stations in Alabama 
involved the leasing of tangible personal property rather than an intan­
gible right to publish as Paramount argued. In Central, the court dis­
tinguished the magnetic tapes and punched cards from the movie 
films. In Boswell, the court noted that the right to publish or broad­
cast the motion picture was physically inseparable from the movie film 
itself. The physical presence of the movie film is essential to broad­
casting the intangible artistic efforts of the actors. 
In Central, however, the physical presence of magnetic tapes and 
punched cards was not essential to the transmittal of the desired infor­
mation from its creator to Central. This information could be tele­
phoned to the computer or brought into Alabama in the mind of an 
employee of the lessor. 
In its summary, the court stated: 
(W]e find in the present case that there is an incidental physical 
commingling of the intangible information sought by Central Com­
puter Services and the tangible magnetic tapes and punched cards 
themselves. We therefore hold that the essence of this transaction 
was the purchase of nontaxable intangible information. 101 
Texas, which first addressed the software tax issue in 1977 in Bul­
lock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 102 addressed the issue a second 
time in 1979 in First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock. \03 In the 
latter case, the bank purchased several standardized or "canned" pro­
grams which enabled its computer to perform deposit and lending 
functions and process general accounting. The software was con­
tained on magnetic tapes, but the information could have been trans­
mitted by keypunch cards, telephone, or various other methods. 
The Texas law places a tax on a sale of tangible personal prop­
erty. Tangible personal property is defined as "personal property that 
may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or otherwise perceived by the 
senses."I04 According to the Texas Civil Court of Appeals, the courts 
apply the "essence of the transaction" test to determine whether a sale 
99. 349 So.2d at 1162. 
100. 291 Ala. 490, 282 So.2d 892 (1973). 
101. 349 So.2d at 1162. Alabama Rule C28-OO1 presently exempts both prewritten 
and custom programs from sales and use taxation. 
102. 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977). 
103. 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
104. TEX. TAX CoDE ANN. § 1.104 (5) (Vernon 1983). 
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is of tangible or intangible property. lOS "If the object or essence of the 
sale is intangible property, the transaction is not taxable."lo6 There­
fore, an important factor to consider in arriving at this determination 
is the fact that the desired information could have been transferred by 
several different means. 107 
The Fort Worth court offered the following analysis of two cases 
in which data was held not taxable. 
In Statistical Tabulating, the Court held that processed data 
contained [on] a coded computer card was an intangible and, [there­
fore,] not taxable. In Williams and Lee Scouting. statistical data on 
oil and gas well production was compiled and mailed to subscribers 
in printed reports each week. The sale was not taxed. The purchas­
ers in both Williams and Lee Scouting and Statistical Tabulating 
[desired] something beyond the tangible object involved in the 
transaction. 108 
The court compared computer cards to "a phonograph record or film­
strip [in which] the information is [contained on] tape," and concluded 
that the transfer in Fort Worth involved a transfer to the computer. 
The tape was no longer valuable or important to the user.109 
Bullock contended that Fort Worth is distinguishable from Statis­
tical Tabulating in that the software in the latter case was "custom­
ized" because it was developed specially for the purchaser. 110 The 
tapes in Fort Worth were "standard items sold to numerous customers 
with only slight modifications to conform to each purchaser's use."lll 
The service characteristic, according to Bullock, "is present only with 
'customized' programs." 112 
The court did not accept Bullock's argument that only "custom­
ized" programs should be exempt from the sales tax. l13 The court 
then concluded that the "test in each case is not whether the product 
105. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548,550 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1979) (citing Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex 1977». 
106. Fort Worth, 584 S.W.2d at 550. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. The tangible objects involved consisted of the computer cards and the paper 
used in the printed reports. The purchasers purchased the information contained on the 
computer cards and in the printed reports. The value of the material used in the computer 
cards and the paper used in the printed reports was incidental. 
109. Id. (citing State of Alabama v. Central Computer Services, Inc., 349 So.2d 1160 
(Ala. 1977); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976». 
110. Fort Worth, 584 S.W.2d at 550 (comparing Statistical Tabulating, 549 S.W.2d at 
166). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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is 'customized' or 'canned,' but whether the object of the sale is tangi­
ble personal property."114 "In Williams and Lee Scouting, the weekly 
report of oil and gas data was a 'canned' publication in that the same 
information was mailed to many subscribers."lls The Texas court 
held that the programs in question were intangible and not subject to 
the sales tax.1l6 
Two years after Bullock was decided in Texas, the Illinois 
Supreme Court heard a similar case and reached the same conclusion 
reached by the Texas court. In First Nat'l Bank ofSpringfield v. De­
partment ofRevenue, 117 the issue was whether the sale of applicational 
programs (as opposed to operational programs), where the data is con­
tained on magnetic tape, constituted the sale of tangible personal prop­
erty subject to the Illinois use tax. IlS First National Bank purchased 
computer "programs [that] were delivered on magnetic tape,"119 
although other means of delivery were feasible. Upon delivery, "the 
information was removed from the tapes and stored elsewhere, [at 
which point] the tapes could either be used again or discarded."120 
The bank contended that "the magnetic tapes in question consti­
tuted intangible personal property, because they were, in essence, 
merely a means of conveying programming instructions."121 Further­
more, the software primarily represents intangible services rather than 
tangible goodS. 122 According to the court, the Department contended 
that the physical qualities of the tapes predominate over the infor­
mation contained [therein]. The Department compare[d] the tapes 
to films, phonograph records and books. All three examples, the 
Department argue[d], represent the physical manifestation of intan­
gible ideas and artistic achievement, yet all were taxable as tangible 
personal property.123 
The Illinois court held that the software in question was intangi­
114. Fort Worth, 584 S.W.2d at 550 (citing District of Columbia v. Universal Com­
puter Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 
S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976». 
115. Fort Worth, 584 S.W.2d at 551 (discussing Williams and Lee Scouting, 452 
S.W.2d at 789). 
116. Williams and Lee Scouting, 452 S.W.2d at 792. 
117. 85 m.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981). 
118. Id. at 86-87, 421 N.E.2d at 176-77. 
119. Id. at 87, 421 N.E.2d at 177. 
120. Id. at 87, 421 N.E.2d at 177. 
121. Id. at 87-88, 421 N.E.2d at 177. 
122. Id. at 88, 421 N.E.2d at 177. 
123. Id. In its argument, the Department cited Time, Inc. v. Hulman, 31 m.2d 344, 
201 N.E.2d 374 (1964), in which the Illinois court decided that magazines are tangible 
personal property and that the proceeds from their sale would be subject to the retailers' 
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ble. 124 It held previously "that where a service of skill was rendered in 
the manufacture of a special milling machine for the particular and 
exclusive use of a purchaser, the sale of the product was not taxable 
where it was merely incidental to the service."12s First Nat'/ Bank 
involved a similar issue: 126 
The plaintiff bank purchased, in substance, the means of pro­
gramming its computer so that it could perform [necessary banking 
functions]. The bank did not desire to spend the money or time to 
formulate the programs through its own data processing staff. 
Therefore it purchased instruction programs from other sources. It 
simply happened that, for the sake of convenience and easy han­
dling, the programs were recorded on magnetic tapes. The tapes 
were certainly not the only medium through which the information 
could be transferred. In this way, the tapes differ from a movie film, 
a phonograph record or a book, [because in the latter] the media 
used [is] the only practicable [way to preserve] those articles. 127 
While film, records, and books are similar to the magnetic tape 
"in that they physically represent the transfer of ideas or artistic 
processes," there exists a significant distinction. 128 Film, records, and 
books "are inseparable from the ideas or processes expressed, 
[whereas] computer programs are separable from the tapes."129 
Software information can be conveyed in numerous ways.l30 It may 
even be copied from off the tapes and stored on another medium. 13l 
Therefore, "it is not the tapes which are the substance of the transac­
tion, it is the information."132 
The court held "that the sale of computer software in [this in­
stance] is, in substance, the transfer of intangible personal property, 
and as such, it is not taxable under the Illinois Use Tax ACt."l33 
occupation tax were it not for an exclusion afforded to newspapers and other materials 
"such as newsprint." Id. 
124. Id. at 91, 421 N.E.2d at 179. 
125. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Department of Revenue, 405 Ill. 367, 90 
N.E.2d 747 (1950). 
126. First Nat'l Bank ofSpringfield, 85 Ill.2d at 91, 421 N.E.2d at 179. 
127. Id. at 90-91, 421 N.E.2d at 178. 
128. Id. at 91, 421 N.E.2d at 789 (citing Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation of 
Computer Software, 18 N.Y.L.F 59,59-67 (1972); reprinted in THE MONTHLY DIGEST OF 
TAX ARTICLES, March, 1973, at 31-40). 
129. First Nat'l Bank ofSpringfield, 85 Ill.2d at 91, 421 N.E.2d at 789. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 91-92, 421 N.E.2d at 789 (citing First National Bank v. Bullock, 584 
S.W.2d 548,551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
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Soon after the First Nat'l Bank ofSpringfield case was decided in 
Illinois, a case having a similar fact pattern was heard across the bor­
der in Missouri. In James v. TRES Computer Sys., Inc., 134 the issue 
was whether the sale of "canned" software is a taxable event. In hold­
ing software to be intangible and not subject to the Missouri use tax, 
the court based its decision on the decisions reached in Alabama, Ten­
nessee, Texas, Illinois, the District of Columbia, and Wisconsin. 13S 
D. 1983: A Turning Point or an Aberration? 
In a long line of cases since 1972, a number of states have ruled 
almost uniformly that software is intangible for state sales, use, and 
property tax purposes. The "knowledge" rationale has been applied 
along with the "essence of the transaction" and several other tests. 
Software has been compared to and distinguished from films, records, 
and books, all of which have been held to be tangible. In 1983, two 
court cases, Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co. 136 and 
Chittenden Trust Co. v. King,137 decided one day apart, disregarded 
this long line of precedent. 
In Equitable Trust Co., the issue was whether the purchase of a 
"canned" or "off the shelf' program on magnetic tape constituted a 
transaction upon which a sales tax could be assessed.138 Equitable en­
tered into several license agreements whereby it obtained the nontrans-
Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341,347, 287 N.W.2d 656,659 (1978); Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc. v. 
Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171,173,575 P.2d 801,803 (1978); State v. Central Computer 
Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160,1162 (Ala. 1977); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 
S.W.2d 405,408 (Tenn. 1976); District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 
465 F.2d 615,618 (D.C. Cir. 1972); County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 
2, 32 Cal. App.3d 654,670-71, 108 Cal. Rptr. 434,446 (1973»; CAL. REv. & TAX CoDE 
§§ 995 and 995.2 (West. Supp. 1974) (subjects operational software to property taxation, 
but exempts applicational software). See also Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of 
Assessments and Tax'n, 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974)(only so much of software as 
consists of services is intangible and not taxable). 
134. 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1982). 
135. See James, 642 S.W.2d at 348-51 for a discussion of the following state cases: 
State of Alabama v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160 (Ala. 1977); Commerce 
Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating 
Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 
548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Department of Revenue, 85 
Il1.2d 84, 51 Ill. Dec. 667,421 N.W.2d 175 (1981); District of Columbia v. Universal Com­
puter Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wiscon­
sin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656 (1978). 
136. 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983). 
137. 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). 
138. Equitable, 296 Md. at 460, 464 A.2d at 249. 
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ferable and nonexclusive right to use several programs in perpetuity. 
Legal title remained with the licensor. 
The Comptroller alleged that these transactions constituted trans­
actions involving tangible personal property (magnetic tapes which 
had been enhanced in value by the copies of the programs coded 
thereon) and are subject to sales tax. In its amicus brief, the Data 
Processing Management Association (DPMA) contended that the 
transactions were licenses to use the programs. DPMA suggested that 
such licenses are a form of intangible property. Equitable contended 
that the predominant purpose or essence of the transaction governed 
classification of the sale as involving either tangible or intangible prop­
erty. The purpose in the transfer of computer programs via magnetic 
tape is to obtain the intangible program, rather than the tangible tape. 
Assuming its position, Equitable supported itself with an overwhelm­
ing numerical majority of reported cases which applied tax statutes 
restricted to tangible personal property.139 
Holding for the Comptroller, the court concluded that Equitable 
acquired tangible personal property (magnetic tapes), which had been 
enhanced in value by the copies of the programs coded thereon. Fur­
thermore, it concluded the licenses did not grant intangible rights 
from the proprietors to Equitable. They simply erected contractual 
limitations on the use which Equitable might otherwise have made of 
the statutorily unprotected program copies it acquired. l40 
Equitable's principal argument as detailed by the Court of Ap­
peals of Maryland, was that the court should conceptually sever the 
program copy contained on the magnetic tape from the tangible tape 
itself. 141 The above argument is premised on the assumption that the 
transaction should be viewed on two operational levels. 142 First, the 
transfer of intangible knowledge or information. 143 Second, the deliv­
ery of a tangible tape. 144 This "legal surgery" 145 requires Maryland, as 
part of its sales tax law, to adopt the principle that the buyer's pre­
dominant purpose for a transaction controls the classification of the 
acquisition as either tangible or intangible. 146 
139. Id. at 466, 464 A.2d at 252. 
140. Id. at 468, 464 A.2d at 253. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. The Court of Appeals of Maryland elaborated on this colorful metaphor. It 
suggested the need for a "scalpel" to complete this "legal surgery." Id. 
146. Id. 
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In its analysis, the Equitable court considered Quotron Sys. v. 
Comptroller. 147 In Quotron, the court recognized a predominant pur­
pose test as one of several factors in determining use tax applicability 
to the type of transaction presented. 148 Quotron Systems undertook 
concurrently to render two types of interrelated performances. 149 One 
was to maintain and to continuously update a computerized data bank 
of economic information. ISO The other was to install Quotron-owned 
hardware, including the remote terminals, on its customers' premises 
for its use in requesting and receiving electronic transmissions of the 
economic data. In Quotron, the court held that the first analytical step 
was to characterize the performance as a single, overall function as 
either the rental of equipment or the provision of services. lSI The 
dominant purpose was to obtain services and not to rent hardware. 
Based on that factor, on the taxpayer's retention of control over the 
hardware, and on the fact that Quotron's hardware could not be ob­
tained without subscribing to the service, the court concluded that the 
transaction was the provision of services. ls2 The Equitable court rec­
ognized that this approach was quite similar to the approach it used to 
determine whether a contract of sale was one for goods or for services 
under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, where the perform­
ance involved elements of both.ls3 
The rule in Quotron was applied implicitly to an undisputed as­
pect of Equitable. ls4 In addition to providing program copies on tape, 
each licensor agreed to furnish certain installation services. ISS One li­
censor also contracted to furnish a limited amount of training within 
the fixed contract price. IS6 
The "dominant purpose" test of whether the property in question 
is being purchased for its own sake or for the intangible information 
contained therein can also be applied, according to the Equitable 
147. Id. (citing Quotron Sys. v. Comptroller, 287 Md. 178,411 A.2d 439 (1980». 
148. Equitable, 296 Md. at 468-69, 464 A.2d at 253. 
149. Id. 
ISO. Id. The economic information maintained in the computerized data bank in­
cluded the selling price of securities which its customers could randomly access through 
remote terminals. Id. 
151. Id. at 469, 464 A.2d at 253. 
152. Id. 
153. [d. (citing Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285,455 A.2d 434 (1983); Bur­
ton v. Artery Co., 279 Md. 94, 367 A.2d 935 (1977». "Quotron did not say that the domi­
nant purpose of obtaining data made the subject of the contract intangible because 
information is intangible." Equitable, 269 Md. at 469, 464 A.2d at 253.. 
154. Equitable, 269 Md. at 469, 464 A.2d at 253. 

ISS. [d. 

156. [d. 
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court, by analogy to books, motion picture films, video display discs, 
phonorecords, and music tapes. 157 The consumer's dominant purpose 
in purchasing these items is ordinarily to obtain the knowledge, infor­
mation, or data thereby conveyed. 158 Books are generally contained in 
a human readable form, while the other media are strictly machine 
readable. 159 A purchase of any of these information conveying media 
is within the imposition of the sales tax as tangible personal prop­
erty.l60 Such transactions escape taxation only if there is an applicable 
statutory exclusion or exemption. 161 These analogies, however, have 
been argued to other courts which have held that tape copies of pro­
grams are intangible. 162 
In Equitable, the court rejected the rationale behind the long line 
of cases that held taped copies to be intangible. 163 This rejection, it 
explained, stemmed from alleged "misconceptions in the technological 
underpinnings" of these decisions, and from the "apparent departures 
in reasoning from that usually applied in sales tax cases."lM Second, 
the court questioned whether District of Columbia v. Universal Com­
puter Assoc., Inc. 165 was consistent with Maryland law. 166 
Furthermore, the Equitable court concluded a "tape containing a 
copy of a canned program does not lose its tangible character because 
its content is a reproduction of the product of intellectual effort" 
which is placed on the tangible tape, similar to that of a pho­
norecord. 167 A phonorecord does not become intangible merely be­
cause it is a reproduction of the product of artistic effort. 168 "The 
price paid for a copy of a canned program reflects the cost of develop­
ing the program."169 The proprietor hopes to recover such costs, with 
profit, by spreading its costs among its customers. 170 The program 
tape is not made less tangible merely because the canned program 
157. Id. at 470, 464 A.2d at 254. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 481, 464 A.2d at 259. 
164. Id. 
165. 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Universal Computer Assoc. established the first 
decision in a line of program-labeling precedent. Id. 
166. Equitable, 296 Md. at 481, 464 A.2d at 259. 
167. Id. at 484, 464 A.2d at 261. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
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placed on the tape is more expensive than the typical phonorecord. 171 
The court stated that Equitable's intangibility argument would 
have merit 
if the direct input by keyboard, without documentation, alternative 
(a service transaction) or the electronic transmission, without docu­
mentation, alternative (no tangible carrier) is the form of transac­
tion under consideration. But, because a taxable transaction might 
have been structured in a nontaxable form, it does not thereby be­
come nontaxable. 172 
Equitable also argued that a purchased program "can be and was 
in fact severed and exists apart from the tangible transfer medium 
.... "173 The copy delivered to Equitable, however, did not become 
severed in any physical sense from the tape when the tape was used to 
structure the computer memory.174 
The court did "not discern any legally significant difference, for 
sales tax purposes between the canned computer program on magnetic 
tape and music on a phonograph record."17S The court quoted the 
Final Report of the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy­
righted Works: "Both recorded music and computer programs are sets 
of information in a form which, when passed over a magnetized head, 
cause minute currents to flow in such a way that desired physical work 
is accomplished."176 In the case of the phonograph record, the Mary­
land sales tax statute was never "viewed as conceptually severing the 
copy of the performance from the tangible carrier."177 The court con­
cluded that "the statute does not sever copies of computer programs 
from the tangible carriers employed in the subject sales." 178 
Chittenden Trust Co. v. Kingl79 was decided by the Supreme 
Court of Vermont the day after Equitable was decided. InKing, "the 
Department of Taxes (Department) assessed a compensating use tax of 
$471 against the Chittenden Trust Company (Bank) for the purchase 
171. Id. 
172. Id. This fonn over substance argument was also adopted by the court in Chit­
tenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). 
173. Equitable, 296 Md. at 485, 464 A.2d at 261. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 40 at 10. 
177. Equitable, 296 Md. at 485, 464 A.2d at 261. 
178. Id. 
179. 143 Vt. 271,465 A.2d 1100 (1983). The Supreme Court of South Carolina has 
recently detennined that the sale ofcomputer software is the sale of tangible personal prop­
erty. See Citizens and Southern Sys., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., Opinion No. 
22024 (Filed Jan. 10, 1984). 
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of a 'canned' software tape valued at $15,700."180 The Department 
classified the tape as tangible personal property subject to taxation. 
The Bank contended the tape was intangible and therefore exempt 
from the tax. 181 
Chittenden Trust purchased the program in the form of a mag­
netic tape. 182 The programming information, according to the court, 
could have been carried by other means, including punch cards, tele­
phone lines, and personal programming. 183 The court concluded 
[t]he fifteen to twenty "man-years" required to develop the "off the 
shelP' program accounted for most of its total value, since a blank 
magnetic tape may be purchased for approximately $15. Once the 
information was transferred into the computer's memory, the tape 
was of negligible value to the Bank, and may be reused, destroyed or 
returned to its original distributor. l84 
The court, holding for the Department, concluded that the com­
puter tape was tangible personal property and, therefore, its sale was 
subject to taxation. The court cited the applicable Vermont Statute 
which provides the following definition of tangible personal property: 
[P]ersonal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt, 
touched or in any other manner perceived by the senses and shall 
include fuel and electricity, but shall not include rights and credits, 
insurance policies, bills of exchange, stocks and bonds and similar 
evidences of indebtedness or ownership.18s 
In holding that the computer tape was tangible personal property, 
the court noted that the tape could be seen, weighed, measured, and 
touched. The tape was not a right or credit.186 The court rejected the 
Bank's contention that the "focus of the transaction" was the transfer 
of intangible knowledge and information, rather than the tangible 
magnetic tape, because the purchase of an "off the shelf" program 
does not involve the sale of personal services. It involves the sale of 
tangible personal property.187 
The court also rejected the Bank's attempts to distinguish a com­
puter program tape from other taxable personal property such as 
180. Chittenden Trust Co., 143 Vt. at 272, 465 A.2d at 1100. 
181. Id. at 273, 465 A.2d at 1101. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 273-74, 465 A.2d at 1102. See a/so VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 9701(7) 
(1981). 
186. Chittenden Trust Co., 143 Vt. at 273-74, 465 A.2d at 1102. 
187. Id. at 274, 465 A.2d at 1102. 
1985] SOFTWARE ACCOUNTING 691 

films, videotapes, books, cassettes, and records. Its reasoning was that 
the value of each "lies in their respective abilities to store and later 
display or transmit their contents."188 A computer software tape, the 
court concluded, is no different. 189 Specifically, the court stated: 
It may well be that the Bank could have procured, by way of tele­
phone or personal service, the same programming information so as 
to avoid a use tax .. To base the tax consequences of a transaction on 
how it could have been structured 'would require rejection of the 
established tax principle that a transaction is to be given its tax ef­
fect in accord with what actually occurred and not in accord with 
what might have occurred.' . . . This we will not do. The Bank 
must accept the consequences of its choice to purchase the program 
in the form of a tape. 190 
It will take some time to determine whether the decisions in Equi­
table and Chittenden are aberrations or the birth of a trend. Many 
state legislatures have adopted statutes that classify canned and cus­
tom software as either tangible or intangible. Several states, however, 
have not yet addressed the tangibility issue as it relates to software. 
As technology advances, some states may reexamine their position on 
software. Future decisions may be influenced by Equitable and 
Chittenden. 
VII. FEDERAL TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
A. The Investment Tax Credit191 
Computer hardware qualifies for the investment tax credit. 192 
Therefore, computer software, in certain instances, may also qualify 
for the investment tax credit. Revenue Procedure 69-21 addresses the 
software issue. 193 It defines computer software to include: 
[A]ll programs or routines used to cause a computer to perform a 
desired task or set of tasks, and the documentaion required to de­
scribe and maintain those programs. Computer programs of all 
classes, for example, operating systems, executive systems, 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 
U.S. 134.148 (1974». 
191. The Internal Revenue Service is currently drafting proposed regulations that. if 
adopted. would classify software as intangible and therefore ineligible for the investment 
tax credit. See Accelerated Cost Recovery System. 49 Fed. Reg. 5939-5941 (1984). 
192. The investment tax credit rules are covered in I.R.C. §§ 38 - 50 (1980). and 
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.38-1 (1979) - 1.50 (1984). 
193. Rev. Proc. 69-21. 1969-2 C.B. 303. 
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monitors, compilers and translators, assembly routines, and utility 
programs as well as application programs are included. "Computer 
software" does not include procedures which are external to com­
puter operations, such as instructions to transcription operators and 
external control procedures. 194 
This revenue procedure specifically permits a taxpayer consist­
ently either to expense software development costs or to amortize 
them over five years or less, similar to research and experimental ex­
penditures. 195 Purchased software costs that are included in the price 
of hardware, and are not separately stated, are treated as tangible. 
They may be amortized over five years or less. Software that is leased 
for use in a trade or business may be deducted in accordance with 
Regulation 1.162-11}96 An Internal Revenue Service Revenue Rul­
ing197 allows the investment credit to be taken for software, the cost of 
which is included in the cost of the hardware. If software develop­
ment costs have been expensed in prior years and the taxpayer capital­
izes software costs incurred for a new software project, the IRS will 
consider the practice to be a change in accounting method and require 
approval. 198 
The IRS treats software that is separately priced as intangible 
property. Therefore, it does not qualify for the investment tax credit. 
Many state courts also treat software as intangible for sales, use, and 
property tax purposes.199 Three recently decided state tax cases held, 
however, that software is tangible for sales2°O and use201 tax purposes. 
These three decisions are diametrically opposed to the weight of judi­
cial precedent. 
At least one case, Hancock v. State,202 has held software to be 
tangible for criminal law purposes. In Hancock, a Texas man stole 
several computer programs from his employer. He claimed that he 
had committed petty larceny, rather than grand larceny, because the 
only tangible property he stole was the paper on which the programs 
194. Id. at § 2. 
195. I.R.C. § 174 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.174 (1984). 
196. See supra note 7. 
197. Rev. Rul. 71-177, 1971-1 C.B. 5. 
198. Rev. Rul. 71-248, 1971-1 C.B. 55. 
199. See supra notes 55-107 and accompanying text. 
200. Comptroller ofthe Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 
(1983). 
201. Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983). See also 
Citizens and Southern Sys., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 
717 (1984). 
202. 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). 
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were printed. The value of the paper, he argued, was less than fifty 
dollars. The court disagreed, holding that the programs had a value in 
excess of the paper on which they were printed. The court concluded 
that tangible property, for purposes of the criminal statute, was 
stolen.203 
In Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner,204 computer 
software was held to be intangible for collapsible corporation205 pur­
poses. In that case, Computax, a wholly owned subsidiary of Com­
puter Sciences Corporation, owned a program for the computer 
preparation of income tax returns. The Commissioner argued that a 
collapsible corporation has been established to avoid tax liability. 
Computer Sciences Corporation claimed that property manufactured, 
constructed, or produced (such as the Computax program) was not 
intended to apply to intangible property of any type.206 If the section 
was designed to be applied to intangible property, Computer Sciences 
Corporation argued that no such intangible property was produced 
since all that it produced and developed for transfer to Computax was 
"know-how" and "goodwill," not "property." 
Other court cases have addressed the tangibility issue for motion 
picture film negatives and software. In the first of a series of Walt 
Disney cases,207 the issues included whether motion picture film nega­
tives were tangible personal property for federal tax purposes, and 
whether the motion picture film negatives qualified for the investment 
tax credit. 
The district court held that the mature film negatives were tangi­
ble personal property for federal tax purposes. It held further that the 
master motion picture film negatives used in the film manufacturing 
process were tangible personal property within the meaning of the In­
ternal Revenue Code of 1954.208 They had a useful life of more than 
eight years, they were depreciable, and they were eligible for the in­
vestment tax credit.209 The Commissioner contended that the nega­
203. Id. at 91l. 
204. 63 T.C 327 (1974). 
205. I.R.C. § 341(b)(2) (1982). 
206. I.R.C § 341; Treas. Reg. § 1.341-1 (1979). 
207. Walt Disney Productions v. United States (Disney I), 327 F. Supp. 189 (CD. 
Cal. 1971), affd. as modified, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 
(1974). The Disney I holding has since been codified at I.R.C. § 48(K) (1982) as a result of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The rationale of this case, however, continues to provide 
strong support for the tangibility of computer software. See Disney I, 327 F. Supp. at 191­
92. 
208. Disney I, 327 F.Supp at 192. 
209. Id. at 190. 
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tives were not tangible personal property within the meaning of IRC 
Section 48(a)(I)(A)21O and that they did not have a useful life of eight 
years. Therefore, the Commissioner contended they could not qualify 
for the investment tax credit. 
Film negatives are used to make prints. The prints are copy­
righted and exhibited in theaters or on television. The negatives, how­
ever, are not copyrighted. The Commissioner argued that all labor 
and production costs of the negatives must be attributed to the copy­
righted prints. 
The court held for Walt Disney Productions.211 Motion picture 
film negatives were considered tangible personal property, notwith­
standing Reg. 1.48-1(£)212 which the court determined was invalid. 
The negatives in question had a useful life sufficiently long to qualify 
for the investment credit.213 Film negatives, like production machin­
ery, are standardized units of depreciable property which Disney used 
to produce the positive prints. The Commissioner's attribution of the 
entire value of the film to the copyright was unwarranted. The court 
analogized such attribution to a situation in which the entire value of a 
machine used in production is attributed to a patent.214 
A third Disney case215 further addressed the film negative tangi­
bility issue. In this case, Walt Disney Productions sued for a tax re­
fund. It claimed the investment tax credit under 26 U.S.C. Sections 
38, 46-50 (1970) for the cost of numerous film negatives produced by 
the company in 1970. The district court ordered the government to 
make the refund and the government appealed. 
Disney sought the investment tax credit for the production costs 
of the "master negative" from which positive prints are ultimately pro­
duced.216 Disney, in calculating its credit, claimed "all the capitalized 
costs necessary to produce the master negative."217 Disney did not 
210. Id. at 191. I.R.C. § 48(a)(I)(A) (1982) states in pertinent part: "[Investment 
tax credit] property means tangible personal property." Id. 
211. Disney I, 327 F.Supp at 193. 
212. Id. at 191-92. 
213. Id. at 190-91. 
214. Id. at 191-92. 
215. Walt Disney Productions v. United States (Disney III), 549 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
216. Id. at 578-80. The "masternegative" has two distinct components, an edited, 
negative version of the film itself ("cut-picture negative"), and a magnetic tape version of 
the soundtrack ("magnetic master sound tape"). Id. at 578-79. The audio is then con­
verted from magnetic tape to transparent film ("optical sound negative"), while the visual 
footage is passed through its own intermediate production stage. At this stage the audio 
and visual components are referred to collectively as "completion negatives." Id. 
217. Id. at 580. These costs were for the script, the actors' salaries, the set construc­
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claim the costs incurred in producing the "completion negatives," nor 
did it claim as investment credit property the unmixed dialogue, mu­
sic, or sound effect tapes, although the expense for those items was 
claimed in computing the overall production costs of the master 
negative.218 
The depreciable base used by Disney accountants included the 
capitalized costs of producing answer prints.219 The court described 
the income-forecast method used by Disney to depreciate each film 
title as the method "generally used for depreciating intangible per­
sonal property. "220 
Disney had claimed an investment tax credit amounting to seven 
percent of its qualified investment in the master negatives it had pro­
duced in 1970. The Commissioner ruled the costs were an investment 
in an intangible property and refused to recognize the investment tax 
credit. 221 The government took the position that, while a master nega­
tive was "tangible" in that it consists of film stock and tape, the 
tangibles, by themselves, were nothing and had no depreciation bases 
for tax purposes apart from intangible rights included in the finished 
product.222 The court held that the master negatives were indeed tan­
gible property, even though the bulk of their value came from intangi­
ble rights.223 
The government next argued that since Disney had treated the 
property in question as intangible for depreciation purposes, the prop­
erty must also be considered as intangible (and therefore not eligible) 
for investment tax credit purposes.224 According to the court, 
[t]he government contended that even if Disney's production costs 
could qualify for the credit, .a portion of the credit allowed for prior 
taxable years was subject to recapture because the motion pictures 
involved were exhibited predominantly outside the United States in 
1970. In that year, more than 50 percent of Disney's gross receipts 
from exhibition of prints produced from 1962-69 master negatives 
tion, as well as the cost of editing and mixing the original negatives and audio tapes to 
produce a "cut-picture" negative and master sound tape. Id. at 580 n.2. 
218. Id. at 581. 
219. Id. at 580. This included the costs of the optical sound negatives but excluded 
the costs of the intermediate visual stage. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 582. 
223. Id. at 580-81. The court pointed out that it had previously reached the same 
conclusion in Disney I and Disney II. Id. at 580. 
224. Id. at 581. 
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came from foreign sources.225 
The court held for Disney on three major points. First, master 
negatives used in the film manufacturing process were held to be tangi­
ble property for investment tax credit purposes.226 Second, the full 
seven percent credit could be claimed because the negatives had a suffi­
ciently long useful life. 227 Third, the fact that the motion pictures in­
volved were exhibited outside the United States in 1970 did not subject 
a portion of the investment tax credit allowed for prior taxable years 
to recapture.228 
The decision reached in Disney III is consistent with Disney l. In 
Disney III the court draws an analogy between a master negative and a 
machine that stamps out patented products for sale.229 The stamping 
machine is tangible even though the product it produces is protected 
by an intangible copyright. The same is true of master film nega­
tives.23o Legislative history, discussed in detail in Texas Instruments, 
Inc. v. United States,231 also indicates that it was the intent of Con­
gress that items such as the master film negatives be treated as tangible 
property qualifying for the investment tax credit.232 
In Disney III, the court relied on Treasury Regulation Section 
1.48-1(g)(I)(i) which provides that property physically located outside 
the United States during more than fifty percent of the year shall be 
considered used predominantly outside the United States.233 Such 
property is therefore ineligible for the investment tax credit. The 
master negatives (upon which the investment tax credit was claimed) 
remained in the United States throughout 1970. Only the exhibition 
prints left the country. The investment tax credit was not claimed on 
them. Therefore, no investment tax credit need be recaptured.234 
The court also held that even though the property in question 
may be treated as intangible for depreciation purposes, such treatment 
does not preclude tangible treatment for purposes of the investment 
tax credit. Three other cases have addressed this same issue,235 and 
have reached the same conclusion. 
225. Id. at 582. 
226. Id. at 580. 
227. Id. at 580-81. 
228. Id. at 582. 
229. Disney I, 327 F.Supp. at 192; Disney Ill, 549 F.Supp. at 578. 
230. Disney Ill, 549 F. Supp. at 581. 
231. 407 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd in part, 551 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977). 
232. Disney III, 549 F.2d at 582. 
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(g)(I)(i) (1964). 
234. Disney Ill, 549 F.2d at 582. 
235. The following three cases were heard together on appeal. Bing Crosby Produc­
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In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States,236 the court addressed 
the issue of whether computer tapes, including the value of the data 
contained therein, are considered tangible personal property for in­
vestment tax credit and depreciation purposes. During 1968 and 
1969, a subsidiary of Texas Instruments was 
engaged in the business of collecting, processing and selling or li­
censing offshore seismic information to various customers who, in 
tum, used that information to explore for oil and gas. While the 
information was furnished to the customer in picture form depicting 
the contours of the earth's different strata, the actual collection and 
editing process involved a complicated computer process.237 
Seismic data were transmitted by electronic impulses and tran­
scribed onto magnetic computer tapes known as "field" tapes. From 
these field tapes, a "final" or "output" tape was produced. The pic­
tures were then produced from the final tape.238 
When a customer placed an order for the information, according 
to the court, he received a copy of the original picture produced by the 
process, a map locating the points where the sound waves were intro­
duced into the earth, and a report outlining the conditions under 
which the tests were conducted. The Texas Instruments subsidiary 
company retained all field and output tapes as well as the original ana­
log film. Information furnished on the picture to customers was li­
censed on a non-exclusive basis. Customers were generally not 
permitted to make the data available to others.239 
Costs incurred in 1968 and 1969 were in excess of $3,000,000, 
and were deducted by the taxpayer as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed these deductions 
and determined that the costs should be capitalized and amortized 
over a seven year period.240 Texas Instruments did not dispute this 
determination, but insisted that it was entitled to an investment tax 
credit and to use the double-declining balance method of depreciation 
on the total capitalized costs of the field tapes, output tapes, and ana­
log film.241 The IRS contended that these tax benefits were applicable 
only to the cost of the raw tape and film itself, not to the full cost of 
tions, Inc. v. United States; Sussex Pictures, Inc. v. United States; and University City 
Studios, Inc. v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1979). 
236. 551 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977). 
237. Id. at 608. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 608-09. 
240. Id. at 609. 
241. Id. 
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producing the tapes and film.242 
At the district court level,243 the government's position was sus­
tained on two grounds. First, when a taxpayer places into service tan­
gible personal property that it produced itself, the investment tax 
credit may be taken only for the costs of the tangible inputs used. La­
bor and other intangible costs must be excluded. Since Texas Instru­
ments failed to allocate its costs between the tangible and intangible 
inputs, no investment tax credit may be claimed.244 Second, the costs 
incurred in producing and processing the seismic data on the tapes 
and film did not constitute making an investment in tangible property, 
but rather intangible information. 245 
On appeal, the government conceded that the district court's 
analysis on the first ground was erroneous. It sought to sustain the 
district court's judgment on the second ground, however, arguing that 
the capital asset in which the taxpayer's costs are invested is essen­
tially intangible. Therefore, all costs of acquiring or producing that 
asset constituted the basis of an intangible asset; the investment tax 
credit and the double declining balance method of depreciation were 
unavailable.246 
On appeal, the court held for Texas Instruments.241 Treasury 
Regulation Section 1.48-1(F) states: 
Intangible property, such as patents, copyrights, and SUbscription 
lists, does not qualify as section 38 property. The cost of intangible 
property, in the case of a patent or copyright, includes all costs of 
purchasing or producing the item patented or copyrighted. Thus, in 
the case of a motion picture or television film or tape, the cost of 
the intangible property includes manuscript and screenplay costs, 
the cost of wardrobe and set design, the salaries of cameramen, ac­
tors, directors, etc., and all other costs properly includible in the 
basis of such film or tape.248 
Treasury regulations, the court recognized, are ordinarily entitled 
to considerable weight in construing the statutory language.249 The 
court pointed out, however, that the Ninth Circuit had previously 
242. Id 
243. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Tex. 1976). 
244. Id. at 1341-42. 
245. Id. 
246. Texas Instruments, 551 F.2d at 609. 
247. Id. at 610-11. 
248. Treas. Reg. § l.48-1(F) (1983). 
249. Texas Instruments, 551 F.2d at 610. 
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ruled the regulation to be invalid as applied to film.250 The Texas In­
struments court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision.2S1 When 
Congress reenacted the investment tax credit in 1971, it expressly indi­
cated its agreement with the Disney I holding that motion pictures and 
television films are tangible personal property, eligible for the invest­
ment credit,252 Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 added Sec­
tion 48(k) to the Internal Revenue Code, and treats motion picture 
and television films as tangible personal property eligible for the in­
vestment tax credit. 253 
In Texas Instruments, the court held that the property in question 
was tangible personal property and therefore qualified for the invest­
ment tax credit and for the use of the double declining balance method 
of depreciation. For investment tax credit and depreciation purposes, 
the basis of tangible tapes and films on which the taxpayer recorded 
seismic data included the cost of collecting the data and recording it 
on the raw tapes and films. 
B. The Credit for Research and Experimental Expenditures 
As a general rule, business expenditures to develop or create an 
asset which has a useful life that extends beyond the current taxable 
year, such as expenditures to develop a new consumer product or to 
improve a production process, must normally be capitalized. They 
cannot be deducted in the year that they are paid or incurred. Such 
product development costs are usually recovered only on disposition 
or abandonment of the asset, or through depreciation or amortization 
deductions taken over the useful life of the asset. 
Internal Revenue Code Section 174, however, permits a taxpayer 
to elect special tax accounting methods for certain research or experi­
mental expenditures which are paid or incurred during the taxable 
year in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.254 Under 
section 174, a taxpayer may elect to deduct currently the amount of 
qualified research or experimental expenditures, or to deduct those ex­
penditures ratably over the useful life of the property or a period of 
250. Id. (citing Walt Disney Productions v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 189 (D.C. 
Cal. 1971), affd on appeal, 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974». 
251. Texas Instruments, 551 F.2d at 610. 
252. S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1971), reprinted in, 1971 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News, 1918. 
253. See also Treas. Reg. § 7.48-1(a) (1983). 
254. I.R.C. § 174(a)(I) (1984). The Internal Revenue Code permits taxpayers to 
"treat research or experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred during the taxable 
year in connection with [a] trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to [a] 
capital account." Id. "The expenditures so treated shall be allowed as a deduction." Id. 
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sixty months, whichever is less. A taxpayer may choose either method 
of deduction treatment provided it is consistent. Furthermore, this 
special method of tax accounting for research or experimental expend­
itures does not have to be consistent with the method the taxpayer 
uses to compute its income in keeping its books. Thus, a taxpayer 
may, for tax purposes, elect to deduct currently the amount of re­
search or experimental expenditures, even if such expenses are treated 
as capital account charges or deferred expenses on the taxpayer's 
books or financial statements. Section 174 does not specifically define 
the "research and development costs in the experimental or laboratory 
sense."255 
Since 1969, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position 
that taxpayers may treat costs incurred in developing new or improved 
computer software in a manner similar to costs incurred in product 
development. Such costs generally fall under section 174. As a result, 
many computer services companies have elected to treat their software 
research and development expenses under section 174 and either de­
duct those expenses currently, or, where it appears more advantageous 
from a tax standpoint, amortize those expenses over five years or less. 
The Internal Revenue Service has not, however, expressly stated that 
software development costs are within the scope of "qualified re­
search" under Section 174. 
The research credit is designed to encourage businesses to in­
crease the amounts they spend on research and experimental activities. 
The credit is equal to twenty-five percent of the increase in research 
expenses for the year over average research expenses during an earlier 
base period.256 The research credit can be taken for research expendi­
tures incurred after June 30, 1981, and before January 1, 1986.257 
255. Id. 
256. I.R.C. § 44F(a) (1984). See also I.R.C. § 174 (1984); the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 stat. 241 (1981), reprinted in, 1981 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 172,241. 
257. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, Sec. 221(a) (codified 
as 26 U.S.C. § 44F (1983». This period may be extended by pending legislation. On Janu­
ary 21,1983, proposed regulations were issued that, if adopted, would place more stringent 
restrictions on software than on other types of research and experimental expenditures. 48 
Fed. Reg. 2799 (1983)(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.174-2(a)(3». As a result of substan­
tial public outcry, the proposed regulations have been withdrawn for further drafting. See 
Yost, A Survey 0/ Tax Issues Affecting Software Developers and Users, TAX EXECUTIVE 
120,128-33 (1984); Arthur Andersen & Co., Research and Development, Washington Tax 
Letter, Sept. 23, 1983, at 3; letter from Arthur Young & Co. to Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue (March 25, 1983)(discussing proposed regulations on credit for increasing re­
search activity-internal revenue code sections 44F and 174); letter from Arthur Young & 
Co. to Commissioner of Internal Revenue (March 16, 1983)(discussing proposed treasury 
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C. A Controversy 
In 1981, Congress expressed its concern over the decline of this 
nation's research and development activities and the reluctance of 
many businesses to expand significantly their research investment, ab­
sent tax incentives. Congress enacted a credit for increased research 
and experimental expenditures. The new credit258 gives a direct re­
duction in bottom line tax liability for incremental increases in quali­
fied research expenses. In other words, the excess of qualifying 
current year expenses over average base period expenses.259 This 
credit equals twenty-five percent of the excess (if any) of the taxpayer's 
average "qualified research expenses" for the taxable year over the tax­
payer's average qualified research expenses in a base period (one year, 
two years, or three years). 
On January 21, 1983, the Treasury Department issued proposed 
regulations260 that, if adopted, would provide guidance for the imple­
mentation of section 44F. Due to public outcry, the proposed regula­
tions have been recalled for further drafting. As drafted, the proposed 
regulations would have set separate, and more strict, standards for 
software development than for other research activities. This stricter 
standard would have precluded software expenditures from qualifying 
for the research credit unless the software project was virtually guar­
anteed to fail from the start, because operational feasibility of a pro­
gram must be seriously in doubt before costs of development could be 
regulation section 1.174-2(a)(3) and (4»; Barres, Tracking the Accounting and Taxation 
Methods of the Computer Software Industry,(1984)(unpublished M.B.A. thesis, New York 
University); Barry, Goldstein & Brehmer, Proposed Regs. on the Credit for Research and 
Experimental Expenditures: An Analysis, 59 J. TAX'N 76,76-83 (1983); Black & Reese, The 
Taxation of Computer Technology, 14 THE TAX ADVISOR 84,84-97 (1983); Computer and 
Business Equipment Manufacturers Assoc., Computer Industry Leaders Declare IRS Vio­
lating Congressional Intent on Software Regulations, Industry News, April 7, 1983; Com­
puter-Software Developers Find Hope in the Research - Credit Dispute, Wall St. J., April 27, 
1983, at 1, col. 1; Hershey, Computer Tax Rules Assailed, N. Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1983, at 
D2, col. 1; Damsky, Integration of the Section 44F Research Tax Credit into The Research 
Investment Venture, 61 TAXES 127 (1983); Feinschreiber, Defining Research for Purposes 
ofthe Research Credit, 35 TAX EXECUTIVE 159 (1983); IRS Proposals on R&D are Inade­
quate High Tech Incentive, Entrepreneur, August, 1983, at 32; Silversmith, Tax Credit for 
Increasing Research Activities, 69 A.B.A.J. 90, 90-93 (1983); Wasserman, Section 174 and 
Computer Software Development, 61 TAXES 506, 512 (1983); Wilkins, IRS Seeks to Elimi­
nate Software Tax Credits, Management Information Systems Week, April 20, 1983, at 20; 
McGee, Software Taxation: A New NAA Research Study, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 
70,70-71,77 (1984). 
258. 26 U.S.C. § 44F(1983). 
259. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a)(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 44F (1983». 
260. Amendments to § 1.174-2, 48 Fed. Reg. 2790 (1983)(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
Part 1 § 1.174-2). See supra note 257. 
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considered for the research credit. The costs associated with generat­
ing programs using standard programming techniques would therefore 
not qualify for the credit. 
As stated in the proposed regulations, the costs of generating pro­
grams using standard programming techniques would not qualify for 
the research credit even if such costs were part of a project that other­
wise qualified for the credit. For example, the research costs associ­
ated with developing a cure for arthritis would qualify for the research 
credit, but any software costs associated with the project would not 
qualify if standard programming techniques were employed. Setting a 
separate and higher standard for software is a radical departure from 
. the current practice. Such a double standard violates congressional 
intent. 
D. Congressional Intent 
When Congress passed Public Law No. 97-34, it was with the 
intent that computer software development costs would qualify for the 
research credit. According to the Republican Senator from Kansas, 
Robert Dole, 
[W]ages incurred in developing new or significantly improved com­
puter software and which presently may be treated in a manner sim­
ilar to section 174 research or experimental expenditures are 
intended to qualify for the new research credit, provided that they 
also meet the requirements of new section 44F which are added to 
the requirements of section 174 and provided they are not subject to 
the specific exclusions of new section 44F.26\ 
The House Ways and Means Committee indicated a similar 
intent: 
[E]xpenditures which otherwise would qualify for the new credit are 
not to be disqualified solely because such costs are incurred in devel­
oping computer "software," rather than in developing 
"hardware."262 
E. Treasury Department Misinterpretation 
By drafting regulations that set a separate and more strict stan­
dard for software development than for other research activities, the 
Treasury has misinterpreted congressional intent.263 Sections 174 and 
261. 127 CoNG. REC. S 8109 (daily ed. July 21, 1981)(statement of Sen. Dole). 
262. H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1981). 
263. Proposed Regulation 1.174-2,48 F.R. 2790 (1983). 
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44F share a common definition of "research." Certain research ex­
penditures that qualify for the section 174 deduction election do not 
qualify for the research credit. For example, research expenditures 
may qualify under section 174 if paid or incurred in connection with 
taxpayer's trade or ousiness.~o.t These same research expenditures, 
however, will not qualify for the research credit unless paid or in­
curred in maintaining a trade or business.26s Furthermore, expendi­
tures incurred to conduct research outside the United States may 
qualify for deduction under section 174, but do not qualify for the 
research credit. 266 In addition, expenditures that do not qualify for 
deduction under section 174 are not eligible for the research credit.267 
The Internal Revenue Service has officially proclaimed that the 
proposed regulations268 are in accord with congressional intent. Ac­
cording to the IRS, that intent is recorded by the Staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation.269 Staff explanations do not constitute offi­
ciallegislative history. They are, however, sometimes used as persua­
sive authority.27o In this instance, the Staff has clearly misconstrued 
congressional intent. 
The Staff explanation was drawn from two principal sources: the 
House Ways and Means Committee Report271 and the Senate Finance 
Committee Report.272 These reports addressed separate and different 
research credit proposals. Portions of both reports were eventually 
incorporated into the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
(ERTA);273 but only after amendment and a series of compromises. 
The original House proposa}274 contained a definition of "re­
search" that was derived from the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board's definition of "research and development."27s The FASB defi­
264. I.R.C. § 174(a)(1) (1982). 
265. I.R.C. § 44F(b)(I) (1982). 
266. I.R.C. § 44F(d)(I) (1982). 
267. Proposed Regulation 1.44 F-4, 48 F.R. 2790 (1983). 
268. Proposed Regulation 1.174-2,48 F.R. 2790 (1983). 
269. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANA­
TION FOR THE EcONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 117-137 (issued Dec. 31,1981). 
270. H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 223-24 reprinted in 105 U.S. Code & 
Ad. News 313-14 (1981). 
271. H.R. REP. No. 201 at 109. 
272. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 75 reprinted in 105 U.S. Code & Ad. 
News 180-82 (1981). 
273. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat. 172, 241-247 reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code 
Congo & Ad. News 172,241-47 (1981). 
274. "Tax Incentive Act of 1981," H.R. 4242, 97th Cong. Ist. Sess. § 241. 
275. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement No.2, "Accounting for Re­
search and Development Costs" (1974). 
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nition was not intended to be controlling for purposes of the research 
credit.276 The House Ways and Means definition, which was not 
adopted, did not contain any cross reference to Section 174 "research 
and experimental expenditures" in the definition of "qualified" re­
search. Congress preferred broader language to a: detailed definition 
and adopted the Senate version instead. Originally, the Senate propo­
sal addressed only wage expenditures, but other costs were subse­
quently addressed. In the version that was finally adopted by 
Congress, "qualified research" was given the same general meaning as 
"research or experimental in section 174."277 
Because the Senate version was adopted, the Ways and Means 
definition should not receive much weight. The House Ways and 
Means Committee intended to have software costs included in quali­
fied research expenditures, and the Committee stated specifically that 
such costs should be included.278 
276. H.R. Rep. No. 201 at 111 n.3. 
277. I.R.C. § 44F(d) (1982). 
278. H.R. REP. No. 201 at 114. 
